The Role of Motivated Beliefs in the Carbon Footprint of Food Consumption
How to cite
Ouvrard, Benjamin; Denieul-Barbot, Anaëlle; Etilé, Fabrice; Muller, Laurent. 2026. "The Role of Motivated Beliefs in the Carbon Footprint of Food Consumption." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0019144. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.19144-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
To encourage shifts toward more sustainable diets, policymakers have increasingly relied on carbon taxes and information instruments such as carbon labels. These policies have been evaluated in laboratory, online, and field experiments (Lanz et al., 2018; Panzone et al., 2020; Kanay et al., 2021; Ambec et al., 2026). Existing evidence suggests that sufficiently high carbon taxes can reduce the consumption of carbon-intensive foods, while highlighting the environmental objective of the tax may reduce its effectiveness relative to a neutral framing (Lanz et al., 2018). Carbon labels generally improve consumers’ knowledge but, when implemented alone, have limited effects on actual behavior (Ambec et al., 2026).
The effectiveness and acceptability of environmental policies partly depend on individuals’ beliefs about both the policy and their own behavior. Yet these beliefs are often inaccurate (Jachimowicz et al., 2018; Douenne and Fabre, 2022). In particular, consumers tend to underestimate the carbon footprint of their consumption choices (Fanghella and Schleich, 2025). Such misperceptions may arise from limited information, stereotypes, or motivated reasoning. We focus on the latter mechanism, whereby individuals process information in a biased manner when faced with cognitive dissonance between their environmental values and their actual behavior. For example, individuals concerned about climate change may continue consuming large amounts of red meat while downplaying its environmental consequences or justifying it through other pro-environmental actions. These mechanisms may distort belief updating and reduce the effectiveness of environmental policies.
This study addresses two questions: (1) To what extent do consumers engage in motivated reasoning when updating beliefs about the carbon footprint of their food choices? (2) Does motivated reasoning moderate the effectiveness of policies designed to promote sustainable consumption?
To answer these questions, we conduct an incentivized experiment in which participants choose among meal boxes containing four meals for two people. We then elicit their beliefs about whether the carbon footprint of their chosen meal box is lower than the average carbon footprint of the meal boxes selected by participants in the baseline sessions. Participants subsequently receive a signal (either accurate or inaccurate, following Drobner and Georg 2024) regarding their actual carbon footprint relative to the reference, and we offer them the possibility to revise their beliefs. First, we aim at determining whether this revision occurs in a Bayesian manner (i.e., whether they revise their beliefs in the direction of the communicated signal) or in a biased manner that may reflect motivated belief mechanisms. Next, we will examine whether receiving this information leads consumers to change their food choices. Third, we will study how policy effectiveness (a carbon tax or label and boost intervention) is affected by the way individuals update their beliefs.
Intervention
We consider three experimental conditions, differing in the public policy implemented at the final meal-box choice: no intervention (control), a carbon tax, or a label and boost intervention. All conditions share the following common structure:
i) Subjects assemble a meal box containing four meals for two people.
ii) We elicit subjects' beliefs about whether the carbon footprint of their chosen meal box is lower than the average carbon footprint of the meal boxes selected by participants in the baseline session.
iii) Subjects receive a first signal regarding their footprint relative to the reference. The signal's accuracy is randomly determined (i.e., it is accurate or inaccurate with a given probability), and we measure how subjects update their beliefs.
iv) Subjects receive a second signal, whose accuracy is again randomly and independently determined, and we measure how subjects update their beliefs.
v) Subjects have the option to revise their selected meal box.
vi) We re-elicit subjects' beliefs about the carbon footprint of their (possibly revised) meal box.
vii) The relevant public policy is implemented, or not (control condition), and subjects again have the option to revise their meal box.
The three conditions differ only at step vii):
- Control: no intervention is implemented at the final choice stage.
- Carbon tax: a tax of €300 per ton of CO2 (the value recommended in the 2025 Quinet report) is applied to the price of each available meal, proportionally to its carbon footprint. The set of available meals is unchanged from the earlier choice tasks and identical to that of the control condition.
- Label and boost: meals display the Carbon-Score label (a letter grade from A to E, color-coded from green to red), provided by Quitoque, the company supplying the meal boxes, and derived from a transformation of each meal's carbon score. The label is accompanied by a boost message indicating that one effective way to reduce the climate impact of food choices is to favor white meat over red meat and to choose meals richer in plant-based protein (soy, peas, lentils) with less meat. This recommendation is consistent with guidance from ADEME and with the scientific consensus reflected in the EAT-Lancet Commission report.
Experimental design
Baseline sessions
A few days before the start of the experiment, around 50 participants are invited to the laboratory (GAEL laboratory) to assemble a meal delivery box containing four meals for two adults, with a value of €60, from the range offered by the company Quitoque (approximately 30 recipes suitable for all types of diets). The average carbon footprint of the boxes selected during the baseline session is then calculated. This value serves as the reference benchmark for the remainder of the experiment.
Experiment
Participants are invited for an experimental session divided into three phases. The objective of the first phase is to analyze how individuals revise their beliefs about the carbon footprint of their diet, distinguishing individuals who hold erroneous beliefs due to limited information from those whose belief revision reflects motivated reasoning. Beliefs are elicited using an incentive-compatible mechanism, explained to participants during a pre-experimental training session.
Pre-experimental training: participants estimate the probability that a meal box has a lower carbon footprint than the average carbon footprint of the boxes selected during the baseline session. This belief is elicited using a mechanism designed to incentivize honest reporting: the participant states their belief, this statement is compared to a randomly drawn number, and depending on the outcome of this comparison, the payment depends either on the actual realization of the event or on an independent random draw. This procedure ensures that the participant's expected payoff is maximized by truthfully reporting their belief. A non-incentivized practice trial is proposed to familiarize participants with the procedure, and participants cannot proceed to the main task until they have demonstrated understanding of the mechanism.
The first phase then proceeds as follows:
i) Participants assemble a meal delivery box containing four meals for two people, valued €60, from the Quitoque range (approximately 30 recipes suitable for all dietary needs). Participants are informed that, at the end of the experiment, a random draw will determine with 10% probability whether they receive one of the boxes they assemble. For these randomly selected subjects, any unspent amount from the €60 will be added to their final earnings.
ii) Participants estimate the probability that their box has a lower carbon footprint than the average carbon footprint of the boxes selected in the baseline session, using the elicitation mechanism described above.
iii) Participants then receive a noisy signal (framed as either a positive or a negative message) about the environmental impact of their chosen box. They are told that this signal is accurate with probability two-thirds. The noise introduced by this imperfect accuracy leaves room for motivated beliefs revision: it allows us to distinguish subjects who update their beliefs symmetrically, regardless of whether the signal is favorable or unfavorable (consistent with Bayesian updating), from those who discount unfavorable signals more than favorable ones (consistent with motivated reasoning). Participants report their belief again.
iv) A second noisy signal, also accurate with probability two-thirds and drawn independently of the first, is sent regarding the environmental performance of the same initial choice. Participants report their belief once more.
This sequence of signals and belief elicitations allows us to test whether belief revision follows Bayesian updating or instead reflects motivated reasoning.
The second phase focuses on behavioral revision:
v) After having revised, or not, their beliefs, participants may modify the contents of their delivery box.
vi) Participants then report their beliefs regarding the environmental performance of this (revised) choice.
The third phase examines the moderating role of motivated reasoning mechanisms on the effectiveness of food policies. Subjects are randomly assigned, between subjects, to one of three experimental conditions (one and only one condition per subject):
- A control group, in which no policy is implemented.
- A group for which a carbon tax of €300 per ton of CO2 (as recommended by the 2025 Quinet report) is applied to the price of each available meal, in proportion to its carbon footprint. The set of available meals is unchanged relative to the previous choice tasks and identical to that of the control group.
- A group exposed to a Carbon-Score label supplemented by a boost message. The Carbon-Score label (letter grades from A to E, color-coded from green to red) is provided by Quitoque and derived from a transformation of each meal's carbon score. The boost message states that one effective way to reduce the climate impact of food choices is to favor white meat over red meat and to choose meals richer in plant-based protein (soy, peas, lentils) with less meat (a recommendation consistent with ADEME guidance and the scientific consensus reflected in the EAT-Lancet Commission report).
vii) Following the policy implementation, participants are invited to revise the contents of their delivery box for the third time.
Questionnaire
In a post-experimental step, participants complete a questionnaire collecting their sociodemographic characteristics and their attitudes on several dimensions, particularly health and the environment. The questionnaire also includes control questions designed to assess participants' understanding of, and behavior during, the experiment.
With this experimental design, and based on the existing literature, we aim at testing the following hypotheses:
Hypotheses related to motivated reasoning:
H1: Individuals hold overly optimistic beliefs regarding the environmental performance of their own meal boxes;
H2: Individuals update their beliefs asymmetrically, assigning greater weight to favourable information than to unfavourable information regarding the environmental performance of their meal boxes;
Hypotheses related to behavior:
H3: Individuals exhibiting stronger motivated reasoning mechanisms make smaller downward revisions to the carbon footprint of their meal boxes following unfavourable information;
H4a: Informational intervention is less effective among individuals exhibiting stronger motivated belief mechanisms;
H4b: Motivated reasoning mechanisms moderate the effectiveness of informational interventions more strongly than the effectiveness of carbon taxation.
Indeed, taxes alter incentives directly and therefore leave less room for motivated reinterpretation than informational interventions.
Design details
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