Cross-Sibling Linkages in the Marriage Market
How to cite
Guha, Arigna. 2026. "Cross-Sibling Linkages in the Marriage Market." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0019119. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.19119-1.3
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
Marriage is among the largest financial decisions an Indian family makes. Dowry transfers at a daughter's wedding can consume more than a year of household income, and the quality of her match shapes her economic security, autonomy, and well-being for decades. How wisely families allocate financial resources across daughters therefore matters enormously. Parents typically arrange their children's marriages in birth order. If a good elder match functions as a positive signal to the marriage market, improving how prospective grooms' families view the household, then parents can capitalise on this spillover by strategically allocating more resources to the elder daughter's match. If no such spillover exists, or if parents misjudge it, the same allocation deprives the younger sister of resources to find a suitable match. This study asks whether parents believe that an elder daughter's marriage changes the younger sister's prospects in the marriage market, whether families on the groom's side actually update their assessments in the way parents of daughters expect, and whether parents act on these beliefs when dividing marriage budgets between daughters. We conduct a vignette-based survey experiment with approximately 520 parents of marriageable-age children in two districts of Uttar Pradesh, India. Respondents advise hypothetical families on marriage proposals and budget allocations under experimentally varied family circumstances. The design separates what parents believe about cross-sibling spillovers from their willingness to act on those beliefs, and measures both sides of the same market - the beliefs held by families of brides and the beliefs held by families of grooms.The findings will show how families allocate marriage resources among daughters, whether beliefs on the bride's side match behaviour on the groom's side or a wedge separates the two, and what any such wedge implies for the efficiency of matching in the marriage market and for the design of transfer programmes tied to marriage.
Intervention
There is no field intervention in the conventional sense: this is a survey experiment in which the experimental variation is embedded in hypothetical vignettes administered within the interview. Each respondent evaluates a series of marriage-market scenarios in which we experimentally vary the circumstances of a hypothetical family, including the quality of a proposed match, the composition of the family's children, and the spacing between daughters. Respondents state beliefs about marriage-market outcomes and make advisory choices for these hypothetical families. Scenario content and presentation order are randomised across and within respondents. All scenarios concern fictional families.
Experimental design
The study is a within-subject vignette experiment conducted using a face-to-face survey of parents in two districts of Uttar Pradesh, sampled from 26 localities. Eligible respondents are assigned to one of two belief modules according to the composition of their own children, and all respondents complete a common budget-allocation module. Scenario attributes vary within respondent according to a full factorial design; scenario order is balanced across respondents using Williams Latin square designs, so that each scenario appears in each position, and follows every other scenario, with equal frequency. All experimental assignments are pre-generated by seeded computer routines, linked to anonymised respondent identifiers, and delivered automatically by the electronic survey instrument; neither enumerators nor respondents influence any assignment.
Design details
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