The Wrong Politics for the Right Neighborhood? Political Cues, Rental Housing, and Spatial Sorting

How to cite

Sarmiento-Barbieri, Ignacio; Fergusson, Leopoldo; Mejia, Gabriela. 2026. "The Wrong Politics for the Right Neighborhood? Political Cues, Rental Housing, and Spatial Sorting." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0019115. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.19115-1.0

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Ignacio Sarmiento-Barbieri* , Leopoldo Fergusson , Gabriela Mejia

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0019115
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.19115-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
On going
Trial dates
2026-05-04 – 2026-08-21
Countries
Private
JEL codes
C93; J71 ; D72; R31
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/19115

Abstract

In polarized democracies, supporters of opposing political camps increasingly live in different neighborhoods, and rental markets are one gate through which this segregation can operate. We ask whether displaying political affiliation reduces access to rental housing in Bogotá, a polarized and highly segregated city where the high-amenity neighborhoods tenants most seek lean right. We run a correspondence experiment during the 2026 Colombian presidential election, sending one standardized WhatsApp inquiry per rental listing before, between, and after its two rounds. The applicant’s WhatsApp profile picture signals support for the left-wing candidate, support for the right-wing candidate, or nothing (no-photo control); we independently randomize the applicant’s name, accent, neighborhood belonging, and gender, with name and accent signaling perceived class and social origin to separate political from class-based discrimination. Outcomes capture whether landlords respond with availability, and how quickly and how fully they engage. We first estimate the average penalty each political signal carries across the city; our primary estimand is the access a left-wing applicant loses in right-leaning, high-amenity neighborhoods; and we test, in either direction, whether this penalty differs in left-leaning neighborhoods.

Intervention

We conduct a between-listing correspondence experiment in Bogotá’s rental housing market during the 2026 Colombian presidential election. Each listing receives one WhatsApp inquiry from a fictitious applicant. The main treatment is political affiliation, randomized through the applicant’s WhatsApp profile picture, which signals support for the left-wing candidate, support for the right-wing candidate, or nothing (no photo, the control). We independently randomize the applicant’s name, accent (a WhatsApp voice note), a neighborhood-belonging cue, and gender; name and accent signal perceived class and social origin, separating political from class-based discrimination. The primary outcome is whether the landlord responds within seven days confirming that the unit is available. Secondary outcomes include the speed, quality, and length of the landlord’s reply, and the number of messages needed to secure a viewing.

Experimental design

We implement a between-listing correspondence design. Each rental listing receives exactly one WhatsApp application from a fictitious applicant whose profile picture is randomized across the political affiliation conditions; the applicant’s name, accent, neighborhood belonging, and gender are independently randomized. The sample is rental listings from the two major online housing platforms in Bogotá, restricted to estratos 3 through 6. Data collection spans the 2026 Colombian presidential first round (May 31) and runoff (June 21), letting us study whether political discrimination varies with electoral salience.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization is performed by computer at the time of daily application assignment. Daily batches are drawn half from lower-estrato properties (estratos 3–4) and half from higher-estrato properties (estratos 5–6), and assignment is stratified so that the political conditions are balanced within each group. Political affiliation. In Wave 1 (pre-first-round), Candidate 3 (Left) is assigned with probability 1/3; Candidates 1 and 2 (Right) are each assigned with probability 1/6; the no-photo control is assigned with probability 1/3. This weighting equalizes the Left, Right, and Control cells in expectation, because two of the four conditions are right-wing. In Wave 2 (post-first-round), the two finalists and the no-photo control are each assigned with probability 1/3. Other dimensions. Name class (high vs. low), accent class (high vs. low), neighborhood belonging (prior connection vs. interest only), and applicant gender (female vs. male) are each drawn with equal probability (50/50), independently of the political affiliation draw and of each other.
Randomization unit
The rental listing. Each listing receives exactly one application, and all treatment dimensions are randomized at the listing level.
Clusters
Between 2,000 and 5,000 rental listings.
Observations
Between 2,000 and 5,000 applications (one per listing, since each listing is contacted exactly once).
Arms
Wave 1 (between 700 and 1,000 listings): Left condition 1/3; each right-wing candidate 1/6; no-photo control 1/3. Wave 2 (between 1,300 and 4,000 listings): each of the two finalist conditions 1/3; no-photo control 1/3. Pooled across both waves: left cell approximately 1/3; right cell approximately 1/3; no-photo control approximately 1/3.
Primary outcomes
Effective response: a binary indicator equal to 1 if, within seven days, the landlord or agent directs the applicant toward the property by confirming availability, offering to schedule a visit, or providing contact information for follow-up.
Secondary outcomes
1. Any response received (binary; expected near-ceiling, analyzed as a descriptive check). 2. Quality of response: effort and completeness of the landlord’s engagement, human-coded on a structured rubric. 3. Length of response: word count across all landlord messages in the thread. 4. Response time: elapsed hours from the applicant’s first message to the landlord’s first reply, plus a categorical version with thresholds set blind to treatment. 5. Number of interactions required to obtain an effective response.

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Keywords