Pay-to-Quit Incentives in Teams
How to cite
Sheeley, Bret. 2026. "Pay-to-Quit Incentives in Teams." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0019112. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.19112-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
Many organizations have recently offered employees payments in exchange for voluntarily leaving their jobs, sometimes called "pay-to-quit" programs. This study uses an online experiment to examine how such offers affect employee turnover and team performance in small teams. Participants are randomly assigned to three-person teams and complete a real-effort task over several rounds, earning money based on their team's output. In some teams, members are periodically offered a cash payment in exchange for voluntarily leaving the team. If a team member accepts a payment to leave, a new participant joins the team so that team size stays the same. The study examines how these "pay-to-quit" offers relate to team members' decisions to stay or leave, and to team performance and cooperation over time.
Experimental design
Participants recruited through Prolific complete a real-effort decoding task in three-person teams over a series of timed production rounds, earning experimental currency that is later converted to U.S. dollars. During the study, team members may have the opportunity to voluntarily leave their team. When a member leaves, a participant drawn from a waiting pool joins so that team size stays constant. The study examines how features of the team's compensation and work environment relate to members' decisions to stay or leave, individual and team performance, and cooperation among teammates.
Design details
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