Pay-to-Quit Incentives in Teams

How to cite

Sheeley, Bret. 2026. "Pay-to-Quit Incentives in Teams." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0019112. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.19112-1.0

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Bret Sheeley*

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0019112
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.19112-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2026-07-15 – 2027-07-15
Countries
Private
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/19112

Abstract

Many organizations have recently offered employees payments in exchange for voluntarily leaving their jobs, sometimes called "pay-to-quit" programs. This study uses an online experiment to examine how such offers affect employee turnover and team performance in small teams. Participants are randomly assigned to three-person teams and complete a real-effort task over several rounds, earning money based on their team's output. In some teams, members are periodically offered a cash payment in exchange for voluntarily leaving the team. If a team member accepts a payment to leave, a new participant joins the team so that team size stays the same. The study examines how these "pay-to-quit" offers relate to team members' decisions to stay or leave, and to team performance and cooperation over time.

Experimental design

Participants recruited through Prolific complete a real-effort decoding task in three-person teams over a series of timed production rounds, earning experimental currency that is later converted to U.S. dollars. During the study, team members may have the opportunity to voluntarily leave their team. When a member leaves, a participant drawn from a waiting pool joins so that team size stays constant. The study examines how features of the team's compensation and work environment relate to members' decisions to stay or leave, individual and team performance, and cooperation among teammates.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization is performed by computer using the experimental software (oTree). Scheduled Prolific sessions are assigned to experimental conditions, and within each session the software groups participants into three-person teams.
Randomization unit
Experimental session (assigned to one of the four conditions). Participants are randomly grouped into three-person teams nested within sessions. The team is the unit within which pay and performance outcomes are jointly determined.
Clusters
120 teams
Observations
360 main team participants (120 teams × 3 members). An additional 300 (approx.) replacement-pool participants may join teams over the course of the study, for approximately 660 participants total.
Arms
30 teams per condition
Primary outcomes
The primary outcomes are: (1) voluntary turnover — whether a team member accepts the offer to leave the team (quit vs. stay) at each decision point, and the team-level turnover rate; and (2) team performance — team output per production round, measured as the sum of members' scores (low task interdependence) or the highest single member's score (high task interdependence).
Secondary outcomes
Secondary outcomes include: individual performance (number of items correctly decoded per round); helping behavior (the number and proportion of a member's correct decodes contributed to teammates' scores rather than their own); and self-reported team attachment, coordination, and cohesion measured in a post-experiment questionnaire.

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Keywords