Demand for Advance Payments: Financial Literacy, Wage Theft and Credit Constraints

How to cite

Bishop, Menna. 2026. "Demand for Advance Payments: Financial Literacy, Wage Theft and Credit Constraints." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0019111. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.19111-1.0

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Menna Bishop*

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0019111
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.19111-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2026-07-04 – 2026-12-31
Countries
India ()
JEL codes
C93, O15, J41, J61, G53, and D91
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/19111

Abstract

Globally, poor people often work under undesirable conditions: low pay, health and safety violations and severe restrictions on freedoms. These jobs may reflect rational decision-making, subject to prevailing market failures, or mistakes born of behavioural biases. This project confronts this distinction within the seasonal labour market that supplies India's brick kilns, a major employer of workers from some of the country's poorest states. In this industry, typical recruitment practices involve a large payment upfront, later deducted from piece-rate earnings built up over the season. In earlier data collection, I document that advances and piece rates are negatively correlated in equilibrium. Moreover, when offered real job vacancies in an incentivised survey, workers on average preferred high-advance contracts even when attached to piece rates which made them far less lucrative overall, incurring a steep effective interest cost in order to be paid upfront. I test three explanations for these preferences: workers may struggle to calculate their earnings under each contract, may lack access to credit and have urgent spending needs, or may fear wage theft. I do so by revisiting 1,000 households from an earlier survey in Western Odisha, linking their responses to real job offers from partner brick kilns. Each household is offered the chance to apply for a real job, choosing between a high-advance contract and a lower-advance alternative that pays a higher piece rate and is worth more in expectation. They also repeat this trade-off across a wider range of contracts in a hypothetical exercise. Half of respondents are randomly assigned to an intervention giving them accurate projections of earnings under each contract, testing whether demand for high advances is confounded by cognitive biases in earnings calculations. Further survey questions measure how much of the remaining demand is explained by credit constraints and fears of wage theft. Together, this research will assess whether advances are an efficient response to missing credit markets and weak contract enforcement, or a contract that leaves workers worse off.

Intervention

The study is an incentivised hiring experiment embedded in a follow-up survey of households in high-migration villages of Western Odisha, India, a source region for seasonal migrant labour to India's brick kilns. During the survey, enumerators offer each respondent the chance to apply for a real job vacancy at a partner kiln for the upcoming season. If hired, respondents choose between two contracts that trade off the size of an upfront advance against the piece rate paid for per brick. The high advance contract pays a larger sum on recruitment but a lower rate per brick. The low advance contract pays a smaller advance but a higher rate per brick, and is worth more in present value terms at typical productivity levels and local interest rates.

The intervention is an information treatment that corrects respondents' beliefs about how much they would take home under each contract. Half of respondents are randomly assigned to treatment and half to an active control group. In the control group, respondents estimate for themselves what their group would take home over the season under each contract, net of repaying the advance, at each of their reported output scenarios. In the treatment group, respondents are instead told these figures, computed from their own reported output and group size. The same divergence is repeated in a later hypothetical multiple price list, where treatment respondents are told the take-home pay implied by each contract before choosing while control respondents are not. The intervention tests whether limited demand for low advance, high piece rate contracts is partly driven by underestimation of the earnings those contracts offer.

Experimental design

The study is a randomised controlled trial embedded in a follow-up survey of roughly 1,000 households in high-migration villages of Western Odisha, India. It has a single randomised treatment, an information intervention that gives respondents accurate figures for their expected take-home pay under brick-kiln contracts that differ in the size of the advance and the piece rate. Households are randomly assigned to the information treatment or to an active control group. Treated respondents receive these earnings figures for two sets of contracts: the two contracts attached to a real, advertised job vacancy, and the series of hypothetical contracts at a wider range of piece rates. Control respondents instead estimate the same earnings for themselves in both cases. The arms are otherwise handled identically.

The primary hypothesis is tested by comparing the two arms on the primary outcome, the switch point in the hypothetical multiple price list. The design also supports an incentivised secondary test on a real application decision, since respondents can register for a genuine vacancy and a random subset of applicants will be invited to recruitment events with the employer.

The remaining, secondary hypotheses are tested mainly through within-respondent comparisons rather than the randomised treatment. The first concerns the mechanism behind the information effect: whether respondents' perceived earnings difference between the two contracts understates the objective difference. This belief gap is measured in the control group, since treated respondents are told the correct earnings. The others weigh two alternative drivers of contract demand, wage theft and credit constraints. For these, respondents evaluate both contracts and their choices are re-elicited under a set of common hypothetical scenarios, namely removal of wage-dispute protection and access to an outside loan.

Randomisation is stratified by village and by a baseline measure of demand for advance payment, and was carried out ahead of fieldwork with a pre-specified seed applied to all 1,494 baseline households. Both stratification variables are controlled for in analysis through randomisation-block fixed effects, and standard errors are clustered at the village level.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomisation was carried out by computer, using R, in the office ahead of fieldwork, with a pre-specified seed. It was applied to all 1,494 baseline households and stratified by village and by a baseline measure of demand for advance payments. Within each randomisation block (a village by baseline-stratum cell), half of the households were assigned to each arm at random. The leftover household from each odd-sized block was pooled with other leftover households in the same village, and these were split between the two arms as evenly as possible, randomly deciding the extra assignment where their number was odd. By construction, the number of treated and control households differs by at most one in every village.
Randomization unit
The individual household. Randomisation is stratified within village, and standard errors are clustered at the village level for inference.
Clusters
Approximately 71 villages. Treatment is not assigned at the cluster level, but standard errors are clustered at the village level, so villages are the relevant clusters for inference. The follow-up targets 1,000 households, and the final number of villages will depend on within-village attrition, since villages are visited in turn until the target is reached.
Observations
1,000 households (the target for the follow-up survey), drawn from a baseline of 1,494 households across 71 villages.
Arms
Approximately 500 households information treatment, 500 households control. Assignment was made in a 50/50 split within each randomisation block across all 1,494 baseline households (about 747 treatment and 747 control). Given that attrition is orthogonal to treatment and balanced within village, the realised follow-up sample of 1,000 households will be close to a 500/500 split, with the exact numbers depending on which households are successfully resurveyed.
Primary outcomes
Switch point in the hypothetical multiple price list (MPL): the lowest low advance piece rate at which the respondent prefers the low advance contract to the high advance contract, expressed as an index from 1 to 6. This is the single primary outcome of the randomised experiment and the confirmatory test of the primary hypothesis (H1), that accurate information on earnings under the two contracts raises demand for the low advance, high piece rate contract. The hypothesised treatment effect is negative, meaning treated respondents switch to the low advance contract at a less generous piece rate.
Secondary outcomes
Application for the low advance job (secondary outcome of the primary hypothesis H1). An indicator equal to 1 if the respondent registers as an applicant for the real job and either accepts only the low advance contract or accepts both contracts and states a preference for the low advance one, and 0 otherwise. This is an incentivised, real-stakes measure, treated as an underpowered validation of the primary result. Hypothesised direction: positive under the information treatment. Belief gap in earnings differences (confirmatory outcome of secondary hypothesis H2, the mechanism). The amount by which a control respondent's perceived earnings difference between the low and high advance contracts falls short of the objective difference. Hypothesised direction: negative, meaning the perceived gap understates the true one. Change in contract demand when wage protection is removed (confirmatory outcome of secondary hypothesis H3). The cross-contract difference in how a respondent's acceptance of each contract changes when told that wage-dispute protection would be removed. Hypothesised direction: negative, meaning removal reduces acceptance of the low advance contract by more. Cross-contract difference in expected earnings loss to wage theft (confirmatory outcome of secondary hypothesis H4). Hypothesised direction: positive, meaning the expected loss is larger under the low advance contract. Change in contract demand when an outside loan is offered (confirmatory outcome of secondary hypothesis H5). The cross-contract difference in how acceptance of each contract changes when the respondent is offered a hypothetical outside loan. Hypothesised direction: positive, meaning loan access shifts demand toward the low advance contract.

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