Property Tax Compliance in the Digital Transition: Evidence from Argentina
How to cite
Schiavoni, Juan Luis; Tortarolo, Dario; Videla, Ulises. 2026. "Property Tax Compliance in the Digital Transition: Evidence from Argentina." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0019076. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.19076-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
This study evaluates whether the physical (printed, hand-delivered) municipal tax bill causally affects tax compliance and revenue, and whether its effect is large enough to justify the cost of printing and delivery. The municipality of General Pueyrredón levies a property-based municipal levy called TSU (“Tasa por Servicios Urbanos”). Most bills are currently printed and delivered to taxpayers by municipal staff. Our experiment will test whether discontinuing the physical bill increases monthly delinquency rates. We randomize, at the account level, whether the physical bill is suppressed (treatment) or delivered as usual (control). Randomization is stratified by prior payment behavior into three groups: (1) excellent digital payers and direct-debit accounts, (2) persistent non-payers ("uncollectible"), and (3) the remaining mass-emission population, which is the main analytical interest.
The primary outcomes are timely payment of the installment nearest to the due date (installment 7), timely payment of subsequent installments (installments 8–9, and beyond), and revenue collected. For groups 1 and 2 the goal is to test the effect on compliance ahead of the 2026-Q4 mailing decision; for group 3 we exploit internal heterogeneity to identify which segments are most dependent on the physical bill (largest revenue loss from suppression). Results inform which accounts should receive a printed bill in 2026-Q4
Intervention
We partner with the municipal tax administration to test the causal effect of the physical bill itself. Accounts in the eligible universe are randomly assigned to either have their printed bill suppressed (treatment) or to continue receiving it through the usual hand-delivery channel (control). The treatment is the absence of the printed bill; all accounts retain access to electronic/online payment channels, due dates, and amounts owed, which are unchanged by the experiment. We measure how suppression affects timely payment and revenue, overall and by prior-behavior group, with particular attention to heterogeneity within the mass-emission group.
Experimental design
Experimental design
The main analytical interest is Group 3 (rest of mass emission), whose internal heterogeneity we exploit via subgroup analysis to identify which segments are most dependent on the physical bill (largest revenue loss under suppression).
We will look for heterogeneity through historic compliance, both measured as timely and non-timely compliance, historical payment-channel mix (digital vs. physical), assessed-value of the property, region or neighborhood, previous exemptions, prior payment-plan use, type of property (lot, apartment, house, etc) and if it’s charged the public-lighting charge (TAP).
We expect larger effects among accounts with room to adjust (occasional/late payers) and reduced or near-zero effects among never-payers (Group 2) and always-on-time/digital payers (Group 1).
Behavior groups are constructed from compliance over a 23-month window (2024 m7–12, 2025, 2026 m1–5).
Group 1: direct-debit accounts (entered directly) OR non-direct-debit accounts that paid on time in every evaluated period with ≥90% of payments made online.
Group 2: zero payments (timely or late) over 2024-H2 + 2025 + 2026, no annual payment, and no payment plan.
Group 3: all remaining accounts that receive a physical bill.
All the relevant data (i.e. properties characteristics and payments records) will be produced by the Municipality of General Pueyrredón and shared with the researchers in anonymized form, both prior to the experiment (baseline) and in periodic batches following its conclusion.
We will use OLS or ANCOVA to estimate mean differences between treatment and control, clustering standard errors at the account level. We may also estimate a DiD specification when using the panel, in order to benchmark post-intervention mean differences relative to the pre-intervention baseline compliance. As standard in the literature, we will control for past compliance behavior when it is feasible.
Design details
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