Undermining Trust: Can Third Party Information Destabilize Collusion

How to cite

Levenstein, Margaret; Suslow, Valerie; Gunia, Brian. 2026. "Undermining Trust: Can Third Party Information Destabilize Collusion." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0019071. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.19071-1.0

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Margaret Levenstein* , Valerie Suslow , Brian Gunia

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0019071
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.19071-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2026-07-01 – 2026-08-31
Countries
United States of America ()
JEL codes
L41, C91, D22
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/19071

Abstract

This study examines the role of trust in maintaining cooperation. Its primary intervention is differing third party information (received by randomly selected study participants). It includes a protocol designed to manipulate the extent to which the recipient of the information trusts the information.

Intervention

Participants are solicited to join an online game. They complete a Qualtrics survey that explains the design of the game and confirms their understanding and attention to the game structure. Participants then play the online game in which they are asked to set a high or low price for the sale of an item. They set the price over an ambiguous number of rounds of play and then answer questions in a follow up survey. Their payoff depends on the number of rounds during which they were able to sustain a "collusive" high price.

Experimental design

We will solicit participants on Prolific to participate in an online game. In the game, they play
three rounds in which they choose to sell an object at a high or low price. They are offered the opportunity to communicate with the other seller and the buyer.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization done by a computer.
Randomization unit
Randomization is done at the level of individual players.
Observations
400
Arms
200 in each arm
Primary outcomes
1. Was collusion (high price) sustained? 2. Do participants report trusting the other party in the game? 3. Do participants report wanting to play the game with the same party in the future?
Secondary outcomes
1. How does the source of new information affect participants' trust in the quality of that information?

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords