Undermining Trust: Can Third Party Information Destabilize Collusion
How to cite
Levenstein, Margaret; Suslow, Valerie; Gunia, Brian. 2026. "Undermining Trust: Can Third Party Information Destabilize Collusion." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0019071. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.19071-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
This study examines the role of trust in maintaining cooperation. Its primary intervention is differing third party information (received by randomly selected study participants). It includes a protocol designed to manipulate the extent to which the recipient of the information trusts the information.
Intervention
Participants are solicited to join an online game. They complete a Qualtrics survey that explains the design of the game and confirms their understanding and attention to the game structure. Participants then play the online game in which they are asked to set a high or low price for the sale of an item. They set the price over an ambiguous number of rounds of play and then answer questions in a follow up survey. Their payoff depends on the number of rounds during which they were able to sustain a "collusive" high price.
Experimental design
We will solicit participants on Prolific to participate in an online game. In the game, they play
three rounds in which they choose to sell an object at a high or low price. They are offered the opportunity to communicate with the other seller and the buyer.
Design details
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