The Effect of Simulated College Admissions with AI Advice on Understanding and Strategic Behavior in China's Parallel Admission Mechanism: A Randomized Controlled Trial

How to cite

Jiang, Ming; Chen, Yan; Liu, Tong. 2026. "The Effect of Simulated College Admissions with AI Advice on Understanding and Strategic Behavior in China's Parallel Admission Mechanism: A Randomized Controlled Trial." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0019060. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.19060-1.0

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Ming Jiang* , Yan Chen , Tong Liu

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0019060
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.19060-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
On going
Trial dates
2026-06-28 – 2026-08-31
Countries
Private
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/19060

Abstract

China's "parallel volunteer" (平行志愿) college-admission mechanism is strategically simple in theory — it is safe to rank a reach school first, because being rejected there does not forfeit later choices — yet many students apply it conservatively and end up "high score, low placement" (高分低就). We run a three-arm randomized field experiment with high-school students in the window between Gaokao score release and rank-ordered-list (ROL, 志愿) submission, to test whether experiential and AI-assisted learning improve their real college applications. All participants receive standard information about the mechanism and an incentivized comprehension quiz. Two treatment arms additionally play a six-round incentivized simulation of the parallel-volunteer game; one of these also receives round-specific AI-generated filing advice. We hypothesize a monotonic ordering — AI advice > simulation > information-only control — in mechanism comprehension, the aggressiveness of students' actual first choices, and the quality of the colleges they are ultimately admitted to. Admission outcomes are obtained from official records for all randomized students; ROL behavior is collected by endline survey.

Experimental design

We conduct a three-arm randomized controlled trial with high-school students who have completed the 2026 Gaokao and received their scores but have not yet submitted their college rank-ordered list (志愿). Participants are recruited from three high schools (two in Shaanxi, one in Shandong) during the window between score release and the application deadline.

Through an online application, all participants receive standardized information about how China's "parallel volunteer" (平行志愿) admission mechanism works and complete a short incentivized comprehension quiz. Participants are then randomly assigned, at the individual level and with equal probability, to one of three groups: (1) a control group that receives only the information and quiz; (2) a simulation group that additionally plays a six-round incentivized game simulating the parallel-volunteer admission process, with feedback after each round; and (3) an AI-advice group that plays the same simulation while also receiving AI-generated suggestions on each round. The study tests whether learning the mechanism experientially (simulation) and with AI assistance improves students' real college applications and admission outcomes, relative to receiving information alone. Outcomes are measured from a follow-up survey and from official college-admission records after the application window closes. Participants receive a participation payment plus performance-based earnings.

Design details

Randomization method
randomization through oTree code
Randomization unit
individual
Clusters
900 students
Observations
900 students
Arms
300 control 300 simulation 300 AI
Primary outcomes
Measured on each student's actual college application and admission (not the in-experiment game): Admitted-college quality — the selectivity rank of the college the student is actually admitted to, measured by its 2025 admission cutoff-score provincial rank (primary), with average-score provincial rank as the pre-specified alternative. Lower rank = more selective. (Source: official admission records; available for all randomized students.) First-choice aggressiveness — the selectivity rank of the college the student lists as their first choice, by the same 2025 cutoff-score (and average-score) ranking. Lower rank = a more ambitious/aggressive first choice. (Source: endline self-report.) Admission choice-order (被第几志愿录取) — the position, within the student's submitted ROL, of the college they are admitted to. (Source: endline self-report / records.) A pre-specified standardized index of the cutoff-rank measures is the lead summary endpoint for each construct; the average-rank versions are confirmatory robustness.

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Keywords