The Effect of Simulated College Admissions with AI Advice on Understanding and Strategic Behavior in China's Parallel Admission Mechanism: A Randomized Controlled Trial
How to cite
Jiang, Ming; Chen, Yan; Liu, Tong. 2026. "The Effect of Simulated College Admissions with AI Advice on Understanding and Strategic Behavior in China's Parallel Admission Mechanism: A Randomized Controlled Trial." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0019060. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.19060-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
China's "parallel volunteer" (平行志愿) college-admission mechanism is strategically simple in theory — it is safe to rank a reach school first, because being rejected there does not forfeit later choices — yet many students apply it conservatively and end up "high score, low placement" (高分低就). We run a three-arm randomized field experiment with high-school students in the window between Gaokao score release and rank-ordered-list (ROL, 志愿) submission, to test whether experiential and AI-assisted learning improve their real college applications. All participants receive standard information about the mechanism and an incentivized comprehension quiz. Two treatment arms additionally play a six-round incentivized simulation of the parallel-volunteer game; one of these also receives round-specific AI-generated filing advice. We hypothesize a monotonic ordering — AI advice > simulation > information-only control — in mechanism comprehension, the aggressiveness of students' actual first choices, and the quality of the colleges they are ultimately admitted to. Admission outcomes are obtained from official records for all randomized students; ROL behavior is collected by endline survey.
Experimental design
We conduct a three-arm randomized controlled trial with high-school students who have completed the 2026 Gaokao and received their scores but have not yet submitted their college rank-ordered list (志愿). Participants are recruited from three high schools (two in Shaanxi, one in Shandong) during the window between score release and the application deadline.
Through an online application, all participants receive standardized information about how China's "parallel volunteer" (平行志愿) admission mechanism works and complete a short incentivized comprehension quiz. Participants are then randomly assigned, at the individual level and with equal probability, to one of three groups: (1) a control group that receives only the information and quiz; (2) a simulation group that additionally plays a six-round incentivized game simulating the parallel-volunteer admission process, with feedback after each round; and (3) an AI-advice group that plays the same simulation while also receiving AI-generated suggestions on each round. The study tests whether learning the mechanism experientially (simulation) and with AI assistance improves students' real college applications and admission outcomes, relative to receiving information alone. Outcomes are measured from a follow-up survey and from official college-admission records after the application window closes. Participants receive a participation payment plus performance-based earnings.
Design details
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