Dynamic Defaults

How to cite

Strulov-Shlain, Avner; Heimer, Rawley. 2026. "Dynamic Defaults." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0019009. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.19009-1.0

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Avner Strulov-Shlain* , Rawley Heimer

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0019009
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.19009-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2026-06-25 – 2026-07-31
Countries
United States of America (Prolific)
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/19009

Abstract

Observational data from a trading platform (henceforth "the Platform"), covering 555,195 traders and 98.7M trades over 2013–2020, show three patterns that motivate this experiment: (i) traders typically accept the Platform's default parameters for leverage, stop-loss, and take-profit (mean "defaultism" score of 3.13 on a 0–4 scale); (ii) defaultism declines with tenure while monthly profits become more negative; (iii) traders in the *lowest* first-month defaultism quartile are the most lossy over 22 active trading months.
This correlation between departing from defaults and worse performance is consistent with several mechanisms. The channel we test here is skill misattribution: if platform defaults are informative, subjects who accept them may do well early, misattribute the performance to their own trading skill, and therefore (a) report higher confidence about their ability and (b) subsequently invest more aggressively when defaults are removed. If skill is in fact the platform's rather than theirs, this greater aggression translates into worse realized outcomes.

Intervention

Participants complete a two-round investment task on Prolific, hosted in Qualtrics. In each round they trade six risky assets over five periods starting from a 1,000-point endowment; points not allocated to an asset stay in cash (the risk-free option). Round 1 is a non-incentivized practice round; only Round 2 earnings determine the bonus.

Three factors are randomized independently at the participant level: defaults, skill elicitation, and leverage choices.

The design tests whether experiencing a good default in the practice round causes participants to misattribute the resulting good outcome to their own skill — rating themselves as more skilled and then, in the incentivized round, investing more and choosing higher leverage.

Experimental design

Online experiment on Prolific (UK and US participants, English-fluent, age 18+), hosted in Qualtrics. Varying defaults in a trading task, and measuring market participation, self-rated skill, and leverage choices.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization is performed in the survey software (Qualtrics). The Round-1 default condition and the skill-elicitation factor are each assigned by a Qualtrics block randomizer with even presentation; the leverage-offered factor is assigned by a 50/50 draw in JavaScript at the start of the experiment. The three factors are mutually independent.
Randomization unit
Individual participant.
Clusters
No clusters; randomization is at the individual level (1,750 individual participants).
Observations
1,750 participants, retained after the pre-specified exclusions.
Arms
Target ~583 participants per Round-1 default arm (good-default / bad-default / no-default). Orthogonally, ~875 receive the skill elicitation and ~875 do not; ~875 are offered the leverage choice and ~875 are not. The skill (show_skill = 1) and leverage (leverage_offered = 1) subsamples therefore contain ~292 participants per default arm each; the H3 contrast (good + bad arms) uses ~1,167.
Primary outcomes
- Round-1 final account balance (first-stage / manipulation check). - Self-rated skill on a 7-point scale, elicited after Round 1 and after Round 2. - Round-2 amount invested at the start of the round (1,000 minus cash). - Chosen leverage factor L (participants offered the leverage tool).
Secondary outcomes
- Round-2 realized return / final account balance. - Average Round-2 amount invested (mean over Round-2 trading periods). - Round-2 liquidation (binary: account reached zero before the round ended). - Stated interest in trading after the task (7-point). - Moderators: prior trading experience (yes/no), general trading self-assessment (7-point), and willingness to take risks in general and in financial matters (two 0-10 items).

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords