Dynamic Defaults
How to cite
Strulov-Shlain, Avner; Heimer, Rawley. 2026. "Dynamic Defaults." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0019009. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.19009-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
Observational data from a trading platform (henceforth "the Platform"), covering 555,195 traders and 98.7M trades over 2013–2020, show three patterns that motivate this experiment: (i) traders typically accept the Platform's default parameters for leverage, stop-loss, and take-profit (mean "defaultism" score of 3.13 on a 0–4 scale); (ii) defaultism declines with tenure while monthly profits become more negative; (iii) traders in the *lowest* first-month defaultism quartile are the most lossy over 22 active trading months.
This correlation between departing from defaults and worse performance is consistent with several mechanisms. The channel we test here is skill misattribution: if platform defaults are informative, subjects who accept them may do well early, misattribute the performance to their own trading skill, and therefore (a) report higher confidence about their ability and (b) subsequently invest more aggressively when defaults are removed. If skill is in fact the platform's rather than theirs, this greater aggression translates into worse realized outcomes.
Intervention
Participants complete a two-round investment task on Prolific, hosted in Qualtrics. In each round they trade six risky assets over five periods starting from a 1,000-point endowment; points not allocated to an asset stay in cash (the risk-free option). Round 1 is a non-incentivized practice round; only Round 2 earnings determine the bonus.
Three factors are randomized independently at the participant level: defaults, skill elicitation, and leverage choices.
The design tests whether experiencing a good default in the practice round causes participants to misattribute the resulting good outcome to their own skill — rating themselves as more skilled and then, in the incentivized round, investing more and choosing higher leverage.
Experimental design
Online experiment on Prolific (UK and US participants, English-fluent, age 18+), hosted in Qualtrics. Varying defaults in a trading task, and measuring market participation, self-rated skill, and leverage choices.
Design details
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