Energy Conservation under Repeated Contracts and Contests: Registered Report
How to cite
Ta, Chi; Garg, Teevrat; Marshall, Guillermo; Lemus, Jorge. 2026. "Energy Conservation under Repeated Contracts and Contests: Registered Report." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0018997. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.18997-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
We propose a field experiment to evaluate whether performance-based incentives for residential energy conservation are effective when repeated and deployed at scale. The study will compare different incentive mechanisms, including rewards based on achieving electricity reduction targets and rewards based on relative performance compared with peers. We will examine how these approaches perform under different enrollment settings, including voluntary participation and broader household assignment, to assess the role of self-selection. We will also study whether effects change when households experience incentives repeatedly and when programs operate across larger populations with fixed budgets. Households will be randomly assigned to different incentive conditions, including contract-style rewards, contest-style rewards, and a control group without incentives. Using smart meter data, we will measure electricity consumption to evaluate both immediate impacts and longer-term behavioral responses.
Experimental design
This study tests different ways to encourage households to use less electricity. Eligible households will either be invited to join the program or automatically enrolled. Participants will be assigned to different groups that receive either rewards for saving electricity, opportunities to compete for prizes, or no incentive. Some households will experience the program more than once.
Design details
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