Collective Risk Social Dilemma and Equilibrium Reasoning

How to cite

Bell, Alice. 2026. "Collective Risk Social Dilemma and Equilibrium Reasoning." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0018962. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.18962-1.0

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Alice Bell*

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0018962
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.18962-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2026-06-22 – 2026-07-18
Countries
Private
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/18962

Abstract

This study uses a lab experiment to examine whether failures of equilibrium reasoning affect support for carbon taxes in a Collective Risk Social Dilemma (CRSD) setting. Pairs of participants play a consumption-based CRSD game with a tipping point. Consumption produces a Byproduct, and exceeding the byproduct production threshold triggers a 70% probability of losing all tokens. The game is played in three variants: a baseline without tax, a game with tax that affects players equally, and a game with tax that creates inequality through redistribution.
The tax alters the game's equilibrium, making both the private and social equilibria superior. If a failure of contingent thinking (Niederle and Vespa, 2023) is present, participants may still vote against it if they fail to anticipate how opponents will adjust their behaviour under the new rules.
After experiencing both a taxed and untaxed game, participants vote for their preferred version to play in a final round, with their stated beliefs about opponent behaviour elicited after the vote. At this stage, some players undergo an intervention to correct the FCT.
The study aims to shed light on why carbon taxes may lack public support even when they improve outcomes, and whether inequality created by tax design compounds this effect.

Experimental design

This experiment uses a variant of the Collective Risk Social Dilemma (CRSD) game, adapted for a consumption context following Bachler et al. (2024). Players make repeated contribution decisions over multiple rounds, facing the risk of a catastrophic loss if a threshold is exceeded. The experiment uses three variations of the game, differing in whether a tax is applied and whether that tax creates inequality between players. After experiencing multiple game variants, participants vote on which game they would like to play again. A randomly selected subset of participants receive an intervention during the voting stage designed to support reasoning about how their opponent is likely to behave. Participants then complete a questionnaire eliciting attitudes relevant to the experiment.

Design details

Randomization method
Treatment assignment to game variant (equal or unequal tax) is determined by systematic sequential assignment, cycling through conditions in order as participants arrive. FCT intervention assignment is determined independently for each individual by a computer-generated random draw with 50% probability.
Randomization unit
There are two levels of randomisation. Game variant is assigned at the individual level on arrival, with participants subsequently paired within treatment by instruction completion time, making the pair the effective unit of analysis. The FCT intervention is assigned at the individual level independently, with each participant having an equal probability of assignment regardless of their partner's assignment.
Clusters
104 pairs
Observations
208 individuals
Arms
26 pairs, untaxed game followed by equal tax 26 pairs, untaxed game follwed by unequal tax 26 pairs, equal tax game follower by untaxed game 26 pairs unequal tax game followed by untaxed game 104 individuals with intervention to correct failure of contingent thinking, 104 without intervention
Primary outcomes
Presence of failure of contingent thinking (FCT), effect of FCT on vote choice, inequality effect on FCT, effect of the intervention on FCT, redistribution between players
Secondary outcomes
Payoff of the collective risk social dilemma (CRSD) game; success in avoiding the tipping point; assessment of opponents' behaviour; political, ecological, and risk preferences' effects on CRSD.

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Keywords