Collective Risk Social Dilemma and Equilibrium Reasoning
How to cite
Bell, Alice. 2026. "Collective Risk Social Dilemma and Equilibrium Reasoning." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0018962. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.18962-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
This study uses a lab experiment to examine whether failures of equilibrium reasoning affect support for carbon taxes in a Collective Risk Social Dilemma (CRSD) setting. Pairs of participants play a consumption-based CRSD game with a tipping point. Consumption produces a Byproduct, and exceeding the byproduct production threshold triggers a 70% probability of losing all tokens. The game is played in three variants: a baseline without tax, a game with tax that affects players equally, and a game with tax that creates inequality through redistribution.
The tax alters the game's equilibrium, making both the private and social equilibria superior. If a failure of contingent thinking (Niederle and Vespa, 2023) is present, participants may still vote against it if they fail to anticipate how opponents will adjust their behaviour under the new rules.
After experiencing both a taxed and untaxed game, participants vote for their preferred version to play in a final round, with their stated beliefs about opponent behaviour elicited after the vote. At this stage, some players undergo an intervention to correct the FCT.
The study aims to shed light on why carbon taxes may lack public support even when they improve outcomes, and whether inequality created by tax design compounds this effect.
Experimental design
This experiment uses a variant of the Collective Risk Social Dilemma (CRSD) game, adapted for a consumption context following Bachler et al. (2024). Players make repeated contribution decisions over multiple rounds, facing the risk of a catastrophic loss if a threshold is exceeded. The experiment uses three variations of the game, differing in whether a tax is applied and whether that tax creates inequality between players. After experiencing multiple game variants, participants vote on which game they would like to play again. A randomly selected subset of participants receive an intervention during the voting stage designed to support reasoning about how their opponent is likely to behave. Participants then complete a questionnaire eliciting attitudes relevant to the experiment.
Design details
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