Seller's Competitive (Dis)advantage in the Market and Manipulation of Own Reputation: A Laboratory Experiment
How to cite
Yasui, Yuta. 2026. "Seller's Competitive (Dis)advantage in the Market and Manipulation of Own Reputation: A Laboratory Experiment." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0018947. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.18947-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
We investigate which characteristics of sellers induce greater effort to enhance their reputation. In particular, we focus on (i) the absolute quality of the goods a seller deals in, and (ii) the relative quality of those goods compared with the goods dealt in by another seller in the market. In the experiment, we randomly assign the quality-types to sellers. One of them is assigned to a relatively high-quality type, and another is assigned to a relatively low-quality type. The absolute quality-type determines the default signal distribution, and the signal realization determines the revenue of the player. Each player can manipulate their own signal distribution, but not others, by paying some costs. We investigate whether the own quality-type and/or relative position in the session matters for the manipulative behavior, even if the monetary marginal gains from manipulating the signals are common among different quality-types.
Intervention
type-assignment
Experimental design
Show-up fee: 1500JPY (If necessary, we may raise the show-up fee to recruit a sufficient number of participants.)
Either “main part” or “risk survey” is randomly chosen with equal probability as a payoff-relevant part.
Experimental currency units (ECU) will be rewarded to participants depending on their outcome in the payoff-relevant part.
Participants will receive their rewards in cash (JPY), depending on the ECU they are rewarded during the experiment.
Design details
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