Seller's Competitive (Dis)advantage in the Market and Manipulation of Own Reputation: A Laboratory Experiment

How to cite

Yasui, Yuta. 2026. "Seller's Competitive (Dis)advantage in the Market and Manipulation of Own Reputation: A Laboratory Experiment." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0018947. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.18947-1.0

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Yuta Yasui*

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0018947
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.18947-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2026-06-17 – 2026-07-31
Countries
Private
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/18947

Abstract

We investigate which characteristics of sellers induce greater effort to enhance their reputation. In particular, we focus on (i) the absolute quality of the goods a seller deals in, and (ii) the relative quality of those goods compared with the goods dealt in by another seller in the market. In the experiment, we randomly assign the quality-types to sellers. One of them is assigned to a relatively high-quality type, and another is assigned to a relatively low-quality type. The absolute quality-type determines the default signal distribution, and the signal realization determines the revenue of the player. Each player can manipulate their own signal distribution, but not others, by paying some costs. We investigate whether the own quality-type and/or relative position in the session matters for the manipulative behavior, even if the monetary marginal gains from manipulating the signals are common among different quality-types.

Intervention

type-assignment

Experimental design

Show-up fee: 1500JPY (If necessary, we may raise the show-up fee to recruit a sufficient number of participants.)
Either “main part” or “risk survey” is randomly chosen with equal probability as a payoff-relevant part.
Experimental currency units (ECU) will be rewarded to participants depending on their outcome in the payoff-relevant part.
Participants will receive their rewards in cash (JPY), depending on the ECU they are rewarded during the experiment.

Design details

Randomization method
Step 1: Each session is assigned to one of three treatments (“20-40”, “20-60”, or “40-60”), which is hidden from participants before the session. In order to collect 40 participants for each treatment, we assign the treatment in an ad hoc manner, but without knowing the participants’ characteristics. Step 2: After the session starts, each participant is assigned to a quality-type (type-20, type-40, or type-60), based on their ID number during the session, randomly generated by otree. If the ID number is odd, a relatively high-quality type in the session is assigned. Otherwise, a relatively low-quality type in the session is assigned. Payoff: During a session, otree app ("random" module in Python) secretly and randomly chooses “main part” or “risk survey” with equal probabilities, and chooses a round/question number as a payoff-relevant round/question.
Randomization unit
Step 1: Session level Step 2: Participant level Payoff: Session level
Clusters
120 individuals
Observations
120 individuals
Arms
40 individuals for “20-40” treatment 40 individuals for “20-60” treatment 40 individuals for “40-60” treatment
Primary outcomes
effort levels to change the signal distribution

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords