Upward Discrimination in Labor Markets
How to cite
Badio, Levenson; Barnor, Kodjo; Palma, Marco. 2026. "Upward Discrimination in Labor Markets." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0018928. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.18928-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
This paper studies a neglected form of labor-market discrimination: vertical upward discrimination. Using a field experiment, we measure the cost of discrimination over managers. Applicants choose between two otherwise identical manager-linked openings with randomly assigned salary gaps. By varying manager race and nationality across three pairwise comparisons, the design recovers the monetary value workers attach to manager identity and tests whether the local–foreign penalty is additively explained by race and nationality. We also collect pre-reveal expected-salary and job-belief measures to interpret whether the revealed authority price aligns with expected pay, perceived career opportunities, or residual preferences over authority identity. These measures are secondary and are not required to identify the compensating differentials. The experiment is conducted on JobPaw, one of Haiti's leading online employment platforms, using real field enumerator job postings.
Intervention
Intervention(s)
This study implements two jointly randomized interventions embedded in a real job-application flow on JobPaw, Haiti's leading online employment platform. Applicants apply for real field enumerator positions.
Intervention 1 — Randomized Manager Identity (between-subjects)
Upon clicking "Apply Now," each applicant is randomly assigned with equal probability (1/3 each) to one of three binary pairwise manager comparisons:
Arm 1: Black Haitian (BH) vs. White non-Haitian (WNH). Varies race and nationality simultaneously; recovers the total local–foreign authority gap.
Arm 2: Black Haitian (BH) vs. Black non-Haitian (BNH). Holds race constant, varies nationality; recovers the local-nationality component of the authority price.
Arm 3: Black non-Haitian (BNH) vs. White non-Haitian (WNH). Holds foreign status constant, varies race; recovers the race component among foreign managers.
Both manager profiles are displayed simultaneously in randomized left–right order. All profiles are identical in job title, tasks, required qualifications, location, language requirements, and application procedures. Manager identity is signaled via name, stated country of origin, and a short standardized video introduction (filmed from a back angle showing head, neck, and hands) in which types a visible verification code. Applicants must enter the code to proceed, ensuring exposure to the identity signal before making any salary-related judgments. Manager gender is held constant across all profiles.
Intervention 2 — Randomized Wage Gap (within-comparison)
Within the assigned comparison, each applicant is also randomly assigned to one of 15 wage-gap levels with equal probability (1/15 each):
∆w = wA − wB ∈ {−140, −120, −100, −80, −60, −40, −20, 0, 20, 40, 60, 80, 100, 120, 140} USD/month
Individual salaries are symmetric around a midpoint of $570/month (consistent with the local market range for field enumerator positions). A positive ∆w means the Manager A–linked opening pays more than the Manager B–linked opening; a negative ∆w means Manager A pays less. Both salaries are revealed simultaneously after pre-reveal belief measures are collected. The wage gap is the identifying variation used to recover compensating wage differentials.
Experimental design
This is a between-subjects randomized field experiment embedded in a real job-application flow on JobPaw, one of Haiti's leading online employment platforms. Applicants apply for real field enumerator positions — common entry-level roles in NGOs, research organizations, and development projects in Haiti.
Design Motivation: Existing work has studied discrimination by employers, managers, customers, and coworkers against workers. This paper studies the reverse direction: vertical upward discrimination, where discrimination is directed from potential subordinates toward the supervisors under whose authority they would work. The central object is not an attitude or survey response, but a compensating differential — the salary premium required to make workers indifferent between otherwise identical jobs that differ only in supervisor identity. The paper introduces supervisor identity as a priced job attribute.
Randomization: Upon clicking "Apply Now," applicants are randomly assigned to one of three binary manager comparisons (BH/WNH, BH/BNH, or BNH/WNH) with equal probability, and to one of 15 wage-gap levels with equal probability. The two randomizations are joint and occur automatically at the platform level, invisibly to the applicant.
Experiment Flow:
Applicant views real field enumerator job posting on JobPaw → clicks "Apply Now"
Random assignment to comparison arm and wage-gap level (invisible to applicant)
Basic contact and demographic information collected
Both manager profiles displayed simultaneously (no salary shown) ; left–right order randomized
Manager videos watched; 6-character video codes entered (attention/exposure check)
Manager-specific expected salaries elicited for both openings (pre-reveal)
JobPaw service-improvement pop-up: pre-reveal job-quality belief ratings for both openings
Randomized salaries revealed simultaneously for both manager-linked openings
Binary job choice recorded (applicant selects preferred manager-linked opening)
Research consent confirmation and application submission
Design details
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