Tax evasion and demand for progressivity

How to cite

Garcia, Angel Solano; Molis, Elena; Foremny, Dirk; Jimenez, Natalia Jimenez. 2026. "Tax evasion and demand for progressivity." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0018912. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.18912-1.0

Download: BibTeX · RIS — for reference managers without a browser translator. Zotero and most others pick up this page's citation metadata directly.

Angel Solano Garcia* , Elena Molis , Dirk Foremny , Natalia Jimenez Jimenez

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0018912
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.18912-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
On going
Trial dates
2026-06-07 – 2026-06-26
Countries
Spain ()
JEL codes
H26, H24, D72, D63, D83
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/18912

Abstract

The main objective of this project is to study how perceptions of tax compliance affect
preferences for the degree of progressivity of the personal income tax. Using a large-scale
survey experiment in Spain, we test whether providing individuals with information
about the actual level of tax compliance reduces their bias on this dimension and changes
their demand for tax progressivity. In particular, we examine whether information about
the differences in compliance levels between the very rich and the rest of the population
alters preferences for the tax burden on each group.

Intervention

This project is built on a large-scale survey experiment to be implemented in Spain. We implement a conventional pre-post information treatment, which exposes randomly selected participants to short videos providing information about the magnitude of tax evasion in the personal income tax (IRPF).
We measure the knowledge participants have before the experimental intervention, and ask similar questions after the treatment, to measure to which extent treated participants updated their beliefs.
We leverage participants’ responses to questions on preferences for tax progressivity to measure how information about the unequal distribution of tax evasion across income groups affects the desired tax burden on each group.

Experimental design

We randomize participants into three groups with equal probability:

• Control (C): receives no information treatment.

• Rich video (T1): receives a short video informing about the average tax compliance
of the top 0.1% of the income distribution in Spain (xr ≈ 77%).

• Non-rich video (T2): receives a short video informing about the average tax compliance
of the remaining 99.9% of the income distribution (xp ≈ 97%).

The two videos are matched in structure, length, narration style, and visual treatment. Both cite the Spanish Tax Agency (Agencia Tributaria) as the source of the figures.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization is done at the individual level by Netquest, the survey provider, at the point of survey administration. Each respondent is assigned with equal probability (1/3) to one of the three arms (Control, T1, T2). Netquest applies ex-ante quotas on gender, age, education, and region to ensure that the final sample is representative of the Spanish adult population. Balance across arms on pre-treatment covariates will be checked ex-post and reported in the empirical section.
Randomization unit
individual
Clusters
7,650
Observations
7,650
Arms
2,550
Primary outcomes
The key outcome variable is the demanded tax progressivity, defined as $\text{PROG}^* = t_r^* - t_p^*$, where $t_r^*$ is the respondent's preferred IRPF rate for individuals with monthly income above 43,000 euros (the top 0.1\%) and $t_p^*$ is the preferred IRPF rate for individuals with monthly income below that threshold (a group with mean monthly income of approximately 2,000 euros). Both rates are elicited post-treatment in all arms on a 0--100 slider. A pre-treatment measure of general attitudes towards progressivity is also elicited and used as a baseline covariate.

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords