Trust in unequal societies: An experimental study

How to cite

Caputo, Roberto; O'Leary, Ethan. 2026. "Trust in unequal societies: An experimental study." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0018892. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.18892-1.0

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Roberto Caputo* , Ethan O'Leary

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0018892
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.18892-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2026-06-09 – 2026-06-24
Countries
Private
JEL codes
C90; D01; D63; D83; D91
Secondary IDs
This study aims to investigate how the source of inequality affects trust beliefs and how this contrasts to observed behaviour. In an online experiment, we exogneously vary whether a fixed inequality within a society of participants is determined through luck or through a mer- itocratic process. We form dyads from a society to play a trust game and a dictator game and elicit beliefs about the other’s actions. This allows us to disentangle to what extent inequal- ity, and the source of such, affects trust and other regarding preferences for equal distribution
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/18892

Abstract

This study aims to investigate how the source of inequality affects trust beliefs and how this contrasts to observed behaviour. In an online experiment, we exogneously vary whether a fixed inequality within a society of participants is determined through luck or through a meritocratic process. We form dyads from a society to play a trust game and a dictator game and elicit beliefs about the other's actions. This allows us to disentangle to what extent inequality, and the source of such, affects trust and other regarding preferences for equal distribution.

Intervention

All participants complete a real-effort task and are then assigned to a high- or low-endowment group. Participants are assigned either with equal chance (Random treatment arm) or on the basis of their score (Merit treatment arm). In the Merit treatment, the high endowment is given to participants who score at least as high as a threshold (the median score from a separate pilot study). The manipulation varies only the source of the inequality in participants' initial endowments.
Participants are then matched with either a high- or low-endowment participant (within the same treatment arm) and play two games, presented in random order:
- a binary trust game, in which they act as both first and second mover and, as first mover, guess the amount their match will return as second mover;
- a modified binary dictator game.

Experimental design

The experiment is conducted using English participants on Prolific.
See document for more details

Design details

Randomization method
Randomisation performed by oTree programme.
Randomization unit
Individual
Clusters
N/A
Observations
800 individuals
Arms
400 individuals per treatment arm
Primary outcomes
Trust beliefs: beliefs about the amount returned by the second mover in a binary trust game. Trust behaviour: share of first movers sending the positive amount in a binary trust game. Dictator (altruistic) behaviour: share of dictators sending the positive amount to their match in a modified binary dictator game.

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords