The Cost of Grouping: Experimental Evidence on Youth Demand for Individual and Group-Based Seed Capital
How to cite
Gebrekidan, Bisrat Haile; Abate, Gashaw Tadesse; Abay, Kibrom; Chamberlin, Jordan; Mockshell, Jonathan; Nigus, Halefom Yigzaw; Workie, Melkamu. 2026. "The Cost of Grouping: Experimental Evidence on Youth Demand for Individual and Group-Based Seed Capital." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0018813. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.18813-1.1
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
Youth-employment and entrepreneurship programs in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) routinely deliver programs, including grants and credit, through groups (self-formed or program-assigned). What such grouping creates economies of scale, such grouping and joint ventures can be prone to free-riding while entailing significant coordination costs. The size of this hidden “tax”, what we call the cost of grouping, is currently unknown, as is the cost of assignment (the additional welfare loss when the program, rather than the recipient, picks the partners). This study uses an incentivized double-bounded dichotomous-choice (DBDC) experiment to estimate three demand curves, individual, self-formed group, and program-assigned group, in the same currency as the transfer itself (Ethiopian Birr). The experiment is embedded in a large youth survey covering 16 kebeles (villages) and approximately 2500 youth drawn from 183 Youth Agricultural Innovation Groups (YAIGs) in Oromia Region, Ethiopia. Incentive compatibility is enforced by a public lottery: one youth per kebele (16 primary winners across the 16 kebeles) has one of her incentivized choices implemented for real. The pre-registered primary outcomes are the median compensating premium required to give up individual allocation in favor of (i) a self-formed group and (ii) a program-assigned group, and the partner-choice premium identified directly by the self-formed vs. assigned comparison.
Intervention
This is a survey-embedded, incentivized valuation experiment rather than a programmatic treatment. Every sampled youth completes a dedicated DBDC valuation section in the SurveyCTO CAPI instrument, immediately after the baseline socioeconomic module and a four-question comprehension check. Each respondent is randomly assigned to exactly one of three valuation modules:
• M1: Individual grant (10,000 ETB) vs. self-formed group (group total B) — premium for autonomy when partners are self-chosen.
• M2: Individual grant (10,000 ETB) vs. program-assigned group (group total B) — premium for autonomy and partner choice combined.
• M3: Self-formed group (50,000 ETB) vs. program-assigned group (group total B) — pure value of partner choice, group structure held constant.
Within the assigned module the respondent answers two linked yes/no choices (double-bounded): the follow-up bid moves up after a rejection and down after an acceptance, bracketing the latent willingness-to-accept (WTA). Group amounts are denominated as the total received by a group of five (G = 5, fixed). The parity floor is 50,000 ETB (= 5 × 10,000) and the ceiling is 70,000 ETB (= 5 × 14,000). The starting bid is drawn uniformly from five bid paths in 5,000 ETB steps {50,000; 55,000; 60,000; 65,000; 70,000}.
Incentive compatibility is enforced by a public lottery: after fieldwork closes, one youth per kebele (16 primary winners across 16 kebeles) is drawn; one of each winner’s incentivized DBDC answers is selected at random and the chosen modality is paid for real as seed capital.
Intervention (public) Youth members of agribusiness groups complete an incentivized choice experiment valuing whether they would prefer the same seed-capital grant as an individual, in a group of their own choosing, or in a group assigned by the program. A subset of respondents (one per kebele) has one of their real choices implemented and paid out.
Experimental design
Between-subjects, three-arm valuation experiment embedded in a CAPI survey of the full youth sample. Every respondent completes the experiment; there is no community- or YAIG-level treatment. Randomization operates over (a) which one of the three valuation modules a respondent answers, (b) the starting bid path within that module, and (c) post-fieldwork implementation draws (which youth win and which of their answers is implemented). Each respondent provides two double-bounded yes/no choices that bracket her WTA for the non-preferred modality. Incentive compatibility is secured by a binding, publicly announced lottery.
Experimental Design Details Modules: M1 (individual vs self-formed), M2 (individual vs assigned), M3 (self-formed vs assigned). Group size G = 5 fixed across both group arms, isolating the formation mechanism from group size. Bid paths (group totals, ETB):
Path B1 (start) B_L (lower) B_H (upper) Notes
1 50,000 n/a 55,000 Floor: identifies youth who accept at parity
2 55,000 50,000 60,000
3 60,000 55,000 65,000
4 65,000 60,000 70,000
5 70,000 65,000 n/a Ceiling: rejection ⇒ right-censored
DBDC bracket mapping: yes–yes ⇒ WTA ≤ B_L; yes–no ⇒ (B_L, B1]; no–yes ⇒ (B1, B_H]; no–no ⇒ WTA > B_H (right-censored; at the ceiling path the right censor is 70,000 ETB). After fieldwork, 16 primary winners (one per kebele) each have one randomly drawn incentivized answer implemented and paid.
Design details
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