Optimization Incentives, Learning, and Strategy Selection in Indefinitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemmas
How to cite
Andres, Maximilian; Bao, Yongping; Breitmoser, Yves; Fehrler, Sebastian; Nithammer, Juri Moritz. 2026. "Optimization Incentives, Learning, and Strategy Selection in Indefinitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemmas." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0018810. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.18810-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
This pre-analysis plan describes an experimental design on cooperation in indefinitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemmas. The design varies optimization incentives while holding fixed the normalized strategic environment and the payoff kernel within treatment cores, and the normalized strategic environment. Its objective is to separate two central margins that are often confounded in repeated-game data: the normalized strategic environment and the cardinal payoff cost of choosing a suboptimal strategy.
Intervention
This is a laboratory experiment on cooperation in indefinitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemmas. The design employs a 2×2 between-subject factorial structure that independently varies (i) the cardinal optimization-incentive level and (ii) the normalized strategic environment. The optimization-incentive level is either High (Treatment-Condition) or Low (Control-Condition), and the normalized strategic environment is either risk-dominant or not risk-dominant.
Experimental design
Each participant plays multiple infinitely repeated supergames.
Within each supergame, participants choose between two actions in each round. After each round, the supergame continues with a probability implemented as a random draw at the end of each round. If the draw terminates the supergame, a new supergame begins.
After each round, subjects observe the outcome of that round: their own action, their co-player's action, and both payoffs.
Design details
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