Looking for a Man in Finance? An Experiment on Fund Manager Gender and Investor Perception
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Lohi, Emilio J.; Phung, Dung Thi-Thuy; Brieden, Tanja; Sponga, Elena.
2026. "Looking for a Man in Finance? An Experiment on Fund Manager Gender and Investor Perception." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0018797.
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.18797-1.1
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Emilio J. Lohi*
, Dung Thi-Thuy Phung
, Tanja Brieden
, Elena Sponga
We examine whether providing investors with information that male- and female-managed mutual funds perform equally can mitigate the industry's persistent lack of gender parity, which may be partly driven by investor demand. In an incentivized experiment, we will test whether investors discriminate against female fund managers and will separate potential statistical discrimination from taste-based discrimination. The former, rooted in beliefs about group averages that may not reflect the characteristics of subgroups or individuals, should decline with relevant subgroup- or individual-specific information. Our design evaluates three remedies: direct investor education, providing detailed fund performance information, and minimizing gender salience in fund presentations. The experiment is intended to isolate the channels through which information shifts investors' beliefs and investment choices, offering practical guidance for addressing potential gender imbalances in mutual fund selection.
Intervention
Participants in this experiment are provided with basic information about mutual fund investment and are asked to perform fund investing tasks. Two information provision treatments are implemented during the experiment.
Experimental design
We run a RCT with student participants.
Design details
Randomization method
The randomization is conducted through the Qualtrics survey tool.
Randomization unit
Individual participant.
Clusters
No cluster.
Observations
Participants are recruited from the population of university students in Austria and Germany. The planned number of individual participants is: N ≈ 750–800 students.
Arms
We have five treatment arms in total:
Positive gender treatment × fund-information control: 1/5 of N ≈ 150 participants.
Positive gender treatment × fund-information treatment: 1/5 of N ≈ 150 participants.
Control gender treatment × fund-information control: 1/5 of N ≈ 150 participants.
Control gender treatment × fund-information treatment: 1/5 of N ≈ 150 participants.
Negative gender treatment × fund-information control: 1/5 of N ≈ 150 participants.
Within each of the five arms, the displayed manager gender is randomized at the participant level for each of the two funds, so each fund × displayed-gender cell receives approximately half of the arm (≈ 75 participants).
Primary outcomes
Share of endowment allocated to an index fund (active fund) displayed with a female manager (vs. the same fund displayed with a male manager).
Probability of recommending an index fund (active fund) displayed with a female manager (vs. the same fund displayed with a male manager).
Probability of switching the recommendation after a realized negative/positive return of an index fund (active fund) displayed with a female manager (vs. the same fund displayed with a male manager).
Secondary outcomes
Measure of individual risk preference.
Measure of individual financial literacy.
Vote for the women-associated charity or men-associated charity.
Demographic background (i.e., self-proclaimed investment experience, age, field of education).
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