Reporting Misconduct

How to cite

Sheth, Ketki; Lam, Quy. 2026. "Reporting Misconduct." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0018796. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.18796-1.0

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Ketki Sheth* , Quy Lam

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0018796
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.18796-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2026-06-05 – 2027-07-15
Countries
Private
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/18796

Abstract

Punishment is commonly used by lawmakers to deter criminal behavior. Punishments do not just punish offenders, but they also deter other people from committing the same crimes. In monitoring and investigating crimes, the inside knowledge or tips provided by private citizens who have knowledge of the crime offer valuable information to the authority. However, it is unclear about the relationship between the severity of punishment and likelihood of reporting crimes. In this study, we examine whether the severity of sanctions will affect people’s decision to report crimes, and how this decision is affected by the relative magnitude of harm and good.

Experimental design

We employ two experimental game in which subjects are assigned to be in groups. In the main stage of the game, one subject is randomly assigned to be a person that has the opportunity to "break the law". Breaking the law benefits the law-breaker, but harms subjects in the experiment. We randomly assign the severity of the penalty for breaking the law and whether the relative benefit is greater than the harm inflicted. We conclude the experiment with a series of survey questions.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization done using Lioness platform
Randomization unit
Individual
Clusters
No clusters
Observations
For In-Group Experiment: 200 potential law-breakers; 1,250 potential reporters For Bystander Experiment: 200 potential law-breakers; 1,000 potential reporters
Arms
Aggregating across both experiments: HighGain, 5% penalty: 60 potential law-breakers; 338 potential reporters High Gain, 40% penalty: 40 potential law-breakers; 225 potential reporters High Gain, 70% penalty: 40 potential law-breakers; 225 potential reporters High Gain, 100%penalty: 60 potential law-breakers; 338 potential reporters Low Gain, 5% penalty: 60 potential law-breakers; 338 potential reporters Low Gain, 40% penalty: 40 potential law-breakers; 225 potential reporters Low Gain, 70% penalty: 40 potential law-breakers; 225 potential reporters Low Gain, 100%penalty: 60 potential law-breakers; 338 potential reporters
Primary outcomes
Reporting of subjects who break the law Deciding to break the law given information on reporting rates of subjects

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords