Experiment on Narratives and Information in Persuasion
How to cite
Batmanov, Alisher; Galaty, Bridget. 2026. "Experiment on Narratives and Information in Persuasion." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0018792. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.18792-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
We study how informational advantage (cheap talk) and narrative persuasion interact in the same experimental setting. In an inference task, receivers observe a dataset and make predictions after receiving a message from a sender who may have additional information and who communicates either through a simple recommendation or an elaborate narrative explanation. By varying the sender’s information and communication mode, we isolate the effects of new information versus new interpretation. We examine how the effects of these message types differ based on whether the senders and receivers have aligned or misaligned preferences. This allows us to test predictions from models of strategic information transmission and competing narratives, and to assess when persuasion works through informational advantage versus framing.
Intervention
Participants take part in an incentivized prediction task. Before making a decision, each participant may receive a message from another participant who is acting as an adviser. The study varies the information available to the adviser and the format in which the adviser communicates.
Experimental design
This is an incentivized experiment with two roles, advisers and decision-makers. A decision-maker observes a dataset and makes a prediction about an outcome after receiving a message from an adviser. The design varies whether the adviser has additional information beyond what the decision-maker observes, whether the adviser communicates only a recommendation or a recommendation accompanied by a written explanation, and whether the adviser and decision-maker have aligned or misaligned incentives. The information and format of messages vary within decision-makers, while incentive alignment varies between participants.
Design details
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