Collective decisions and intertemporal risk choices
How to cite
Dai, Ming. 2026. "Collective decisions and intertemporal risk choices." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0018758. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.18758-2.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
Many critical real-world choices—ranging from corporate board investments to financial regulatory policies—are made by groups rather than isolated individuals. Crucially, these collective decisions are rarely simple; they routinely involve multi-dimensional settings where outcomes are both uncertain (risky) and delayed in time (intertemporal). While standard economic theories often assume a frictionless aggregation of preferences, real-world committees operate under specific formal protocols: institutional voting thresholds and asymmetric distributions of voting power.This study conducts a controlled laboratory experiment to systematically investigate how formal institutional designs shape collective choice in these complex environments. We implement a randomized 2 X 2 between-subject factorial design, manipulating two core institutional dimensions: (1) Voting Rules, comparing a two-thirds majority rule against a strict unanimity rule; and (2) Voting Weights, comparing an unweighted system (equal power) against a weighted system (where a designated leader possesses asymmetric voting power). Group members are presented with canonical choice lists trading off immediate, certain payoffs against delayed, probabilistic rewards.By tracking the complete trajectory of the collective bargaining process—from initial individual proposals, through group deliberation, to the final voting outcomes—this study aims to uncover how voting rules and power structures jointly condition a group's propensity for risk-taking and its sensitivity to time discounting. Given the large and saturated sample size of 200 independent interaction groups (600 participants in total), this project provides high-powered, clean empirical evidence for the micro-foundations of institutional design, offering actionable insights for optimizing decision-making protocols in corporate governance and financial institutions.
Intervention
Participants are randomly assigned to a 3-person group to complete two behavioral tasks: a Risky Choice (RC) task and a Risky-Intertemporal Choice (RIC) task. The study implements a 2 X 2 between-subject factorial design to evaluate how group decisions are shaped by two distinct dimensions of institutional design:
1. Factor 1: Voting Rules (Threshold for Agreement)
(1) Majority Rule Treatment: A group decision is successfully reached and executed if a specific proposal receives support from at least two out of the three members (a two-thirds majority threshold).
(2)Unanimity Rule Treatment: A group decision strictly requires the unanimous support of all three group members (a consensus threshold).
2. Factor 2: Voting Weights (Power Distribution)
(1) Unweighted System Treatment: All three group members possess equal voting power (each member has exactly 1 vote). Group earnings from the selected tasks are distributed equally among all members.
(2) Weighted System Treatment: Voting power is distributed asymmetrically. One randomly designated group leader is allocated 2 votes, while the remaining two ordinary members are allocated 1 vote each. Under this setup, a total of 4 votes exist within the group. To pass a proposal under the Majority Rule, a threshold of 3 votes is required. Earnings from the task are distributed proportionally based on each member's voting weight (the leader receives a higher share of the payoff).
In all treatments, if a group fails to reach an agreement within 5 formal coordination rounds, a deadlock is declared, and all members receive a zero payoff for that specific task.
Experimental design
This study employs a mixed between-within subject factorial design to rigorously evaluate the causal impacts of formal voting rules and voting weights on collective intertemporal choices under uncertainty. The unit of randomization and independent statistical inference is fixed strictly at the group level (3-person interaction sessions) to fully control for intra-group correlation.
1. Between-Subject Factors (2 × 2 Factorial Treatment Cells)
Subjects are randomly assigned to one of four distinct, mutually exclusive institutional treatment cells upon arrival at the laboratory:
Treatment 1 (U-Uw) Unanimity & Unweighted: Decisions strictly require unanimous support from all 3 members (consensus threshold). All members possess equal voting power (1 vote each).
Treatment 2 (U-W) Unanimity & Weighted: Decisions strictly require unanimous support from all 3 members. Voting power is distributed asymmetrically: one randomly designated leader holds 2 votes, while the remaining two members hold 1 vote each.
Treatment 3 (M-Uw) Majority & Unweighted: Decisions require agreement from at least two out of three members (2/3 majority threshold). All members possess equal voting power (1 vote each).
Treatment 4 (M-W) Majority & Weighted: Voting power is distributed asymmetrically (Leader has 2 votes; each ordinary member has 1 vote; total = 4 votes). The institutional passage threshold is set to a strict minimum of 3 votes.
2. Within-Subject Factors (Multi-Dimensional Risk Tasks)
Every independent group completes two sequential conditions across four formal parts (Parts A to D) to elicit baseline individual preferences and final collective outcomes:
Condition 1: Risky Choice (RC) Task: Elicits pure risk preferences using a multiple price list (MPL) framework, trading off a certain, immediate payoff (Option A) against a probabilistic, immediate reward (Option B).
Condition 2: Risky-Intertemporal Choice (RIC) Task: Imposes a 4-week temporal delay on all potential payoffs of the risky option (Option B) while keeping the certain option (Option A) immediate, thereby capturing the direct behavioral interaction of risk taking and time discounting.
To control for order effects, my experimental design also counterbalanced the order of the Risky Choice task and the Risky-Intertemporal Choice task.
3. Coordination Protocol and Deadlock Rule
Within each group task (Parts B and D), a structured, dynamic coordination protocol is executed for a maximum of 5 formal rounds. Each round sequentially consists of: (i) Simultaneous Proposal Submission, (ii) Anonymous Free-Form Group Chat Deliberation, and (iii) Simultaneous Voting. If a group fails to reach a binding collective decision matching their treatment's threshold by the end of Round 5, a complete contract deadlock is declared, and all members earn zero payoff for that task.
Design details
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