Mixed Repeated and One Time Player Games: Criminal Plea Negotiations Simulation
How to cite
Neligh, Nathaniel; Barton, Benjamin. 2026. "Mixed Repeated and One Time Player Games: Criminal Plea Negotiations Simulation." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0018751. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.18751-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
Many experiments have compared the behavior of players in finitely repeated games and indefinitely repeated games, but to our knowledge no experiments have examined the impact of mixed-continuation games where some some players repeat the game indefinitely while others cycle through for a single round. In this experiment, we study a mixed-continuation game based on plea bargaining in the United States criminal justice system. In this system prosecuting district attorneys (DAs) and public defenders (PDs) will generally interact frequently across many cases. On the other hand, defendants typically only interact with these attorneys for a single case. This incentivized experiment tests whether the long term relationships between DAs and PDs harm clients or reduce the fairness of the court system. We also examine whether these long term relationships impact the probability of going to trial, which has a large impact on the efficiency of the proceedings.
Experimental design
Students participate in an incentivized experiment where they take the roles of DAs, PDs, and defendants making decisions in a mock criminal plea negotiation setting.
Design details
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