Weathering the Waste: Inventory Choice, Market Aggregation, and Food Loss Among Urban Street Vendors

How to cite

Singh, Lachi; Dhingra, Swati. 2026. "Weathering the Waste: Inventory Choice, Market Aggregation, and Food Loss Among Urban Street Vendors." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0018750. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.18750-1.2

Download: BibTeX · RIS — for reference managers without a browser translator. Zotero and most others pick up this page's citation metadata directly.

Lachi Singh* , Swati Dhingra

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0018750
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.18750-1.2
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2026-07-15 – 2027-01-22
Countries
Private
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/18750

Abstract

Do decentralized markets efficiently aggregate supply decisions when firms must commit inventory under correlated uncertainty? We study street vendors selling perishable produce in Patna, India, who first commit to inventory at wholesale markets then set retail prices during the trading day. Demand uncertainty is driven by weather and marketplace-day footfall affecting all vendors simultaneously. Waste from spoilage provides a direct measure of costly supply mistakes. We develop a two-stage model identifying three inefficiency channels: business-stealing through prices, availability externalities through stockout spillovers, and coordination failure under correlated shocks. Our empirical strategy combines vendor-level panel data with randomized price experiments. Vendors are notified of treatment the evening before, so the experiment activates both the inventory response at the wholesale market and the price and sales response during the trading day. Conditional price subsidies for randomly selected vendors thereby identify demand substitution, strategic conduct, and uncertainty decomposition across both stages. We test whether vendors optimize individually and whether markets achieve efficient aggregation, classifying behaviour into scenarios based on individual versus market efficiency. The analysis will establish whether inefficiency arises from individual mistakes (learning errors, biases) or market failures (strategic competition, coordination)---a distinction critical for policy, since if markets exhibit individual efficiency with market inefficiency, improving individual forecasting cannot address strategic externalities.

Experimental design

We study inventory decisions and market outcomes among informal fresh produce street vendors in Patna, India. Vendors are randomised to a treatment arm or a control arm, with treated vendors receiving a temporary price incentive on designated treatment days. The same vendors are observed across treatment and control days throughout the study. Primary outcomes are daily inventory procurement quantity, sales quantity, and end-of-day waste. Secondary outcomes include retail prices and stockout incidence.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization done in office by a computer
Randomization unit
First level of randomisation: treatment day assignment at the market level, re-randomised weekly. Second level of randomisation: treatment arm assignment at the product-vendor level within each market, permanent throughout the study.
Clusters
30 (experiment markets)
Observations
36,315 (807 product-vendors × 45 active survey days)
Arms
~404 treatment product-vendors, ~403 control product-vendors
Primary outcomes
Incidences of stock outs, produce inventory, sales, produce waste

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords