Administrative Complexity, Take-Up, and Targeting of Social Benefits
How to cite
Petkov, Boyan; Necker, Sarah; Bruckmeyer, Kerstin. 2026. "Administrative Complexity, Take-Up, and Targeting of Social Benefits." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0018684. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.18684-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
This study examines how administrative requirements affect intended take-up and targeting of means-tested social benefits. We implement a vignette-based factorial experiment in the IAB Online Panel for Labour Market Research (IAB-OPAL). Respondents evaluate hypothetical minimum-income benefits that vary randomly in benefit amount and administrative requirements, including application obligations, form length, documentation requirements, documentation mode, language assistance, and application channel/travel time. The main outcome is whether respondents would apply for the benefit. We estimate average marginal component effects of administrative requirements on application intentions and express these effects as willingness to pay for avoiding specific requirements. We also study heterogeneity by measures of need and resource scarcity, including income, wealth and liquidity, household composition, employment status, prior benefit receipt, labor-market attachment, poverty status, and self-reported ability to get by. Finally, we use stated reasons for non-application to examine which cost channels, such as cognitive costs, psychological costs, and time and effort costs, drive non-take-up, and validate experimental behavior against administrative records on benefit receipt history. The project aims to distinguish whether administrative requirements improve targeting by deterring lower-need households or instead create access barriers for households with greater economic need.
Experimental design
We implement a vignette-based factorial experiment in the IAB Online Panel for Labour Market Research (IAB-OPAL). Respondents evaluate hypothetical minimum-income benefit programs in an online survey. The hypothetical setting describes a reform in which existing social transfers are replaced by a single social benefit for living expenses and housing. Respondents are then shown four hypothetical benefit programs and state for each program whether they would apply.
The hypothetical scenario differs by respondents’ equivalized household labor income. Respondents with equivalized household labor income above a pre-specified threshold are asked to imagine that their household has no labor income and no state transfers. Respondents below the threshold are asked to imagine the same social-benefit reform while their household labor income remains in place. This assignment to scenario conditions is based on respondents’ income and is therefore not randomized. It is included to make the hypothetical benefit decision relevant also for higher-income respondents, who would otherwise have little reason to apply for the benefit irrespective of the administrative requirements.
Before the vignette decisions, respondents answer a question about how long their household could get by in the hypothetical scenario. This measure captures self-reported need in the hypothetical scenario. It also helps respondents apply the hypothetical scenario to their own household before evaluating the benefit profiles.
The vignette attributes are randomized at the respondent-vignette level. The randomized attributes are the monthly benefit amount, application obligations, form length, documentation type, documentation mode, language assistance, and application channel/travel time. The benefit amount is calculated around an SGB-II-style household-specific benchmark based on household composition, housing status, and income in the hypothetical scenario, with random variation added around this benchmark. Administrative requirements vary across vignettes to identify their causal effects on application intentions.
The main outcome is whether the respondent would apply for the hypothetical benefit. We estimate average marginal component effects of each administrative requirement relative to the least burdensome reference category of the same attribute. We also convert these effects into willingness-to-pay measures using the randomized benefit amount. Heterogeneity analyses examine whether administrative requirements deter respondents differently by measures of need and resource scarcity, including household labor income excluding transfers, wealth and liquidity, self-reported ability to get by in the hypothetical scenario, education, employment status, household composition, prior or current benefit receipt, labor-market attachment, poverty status, and the approximated benefit amount the household would receive under the current SGB-II benchmark.
For mechanism analysis, respondents who reject at least one vignette are asked about their reasons for non-application. We use these responses to construct cost-channel indicators, including perceived ineligibility or low financial relevance, documentation feasibility, cognitive costs, psychological costs, time and effort costs, and physical limitations.
Design details
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