Career Choices in Rigid Labor Markets: Political Connection as an Insurance Device

How to cite

Kovo, Lazare; Zozoungbo, Christelle. 2026. "Career Choices in Rigid Labor Markets: Political Connection as an Insurance Device." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0018680. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.18680-1.0

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Lazare Kovo* , Christelle Zozoungbo

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0018680
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.18680-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
On going
Trial dates
2026-04-28 – 2026-05-31
Countries
Benin (All Regions)
JEL codes
J24, P16, J62, O15, D72
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/18680

Abstract

Political connections shape access to economic opportunities in many developing countries, yet little is known about how they influence educational and occupational choices before labor-market entry. This paper argues that political connections act as an informal insurance device in rigid labor markets by increasing access to desirable public-sector jobs. Anticipating these advantages, connected individuals are more likely to invest in education and pursue public-sector careers. Using household survey data from Benin, we show that politically connected individuals are more likely to aspire to top-tier public-sector occupations, less likely to pursue entrepreneurship, less likely to drop out of school, and more likely to aspire to higher education. To further examine the underlying mechanisms, we complement the observational analysis with an ongoing in-the-field survey experiment that randomly varies information about labor-market opportunities among parents and students. The experiment measures how perceived access to jobs shapes parental educational investments as well as students’ educational and occupational aspirations. The study presents a unique opportunity to better understand how political networks influence human capital investment and career choices long before labor-market entry.

Intervention

Political connections shape access to economic opportunities in many developing countries, yet their influence extends beyond labor-market outcomes to earlier decisions about education and careers. Using household survey data from Benin, we document that individuals with political connections are more likely to aspire to top-tier public-sector jobs, less likely to pursue entrepreneurship, less likely to drop out of school, and more likely to aim for higher education. These patterns suggest that connections affect behavior well before labor-market entry. However, observational evidence alone cannot determine whether these differences arise from access to connections themselves or from beliefs about how jobs are allocated.

The theoretical framework posits that labor-market outcomes depend primarily on individual qualifications and ability, but that political connections can partially substitute for these determinants. By reducing job search costs and increasing the likelihood of securing desirable positions—especially in the public sector—connections make certain career paths more attainable. Anticipating these advantages, individuals adjust their educational and occupational choices toward jobs that connections can help secure. Because such jobs typically require minimum educational credentials, individuals—even those with relatively low academic performance—may aim to meet these thresholds rather than invest in higher levels of human capital. In this way, political connections shape incentives by altering both access to jobs and the perceived returns to education.

The intervention is an in-the-field survey experiment designed to isolate this mechanism by exogenously shifting perceptions about job access. The study targets parents and secondary-school students in Benin and presents them with structured scenarios describing the transition from school to the labor market.

The information treatments rely on carefully standardized vignettes presented to both students and parents, with parallel structures across groups. All students receive a baseline scenario describing an individual (or child) completing secondary school and choosing among similar post-secondary options, with job access formally tied to educational performance. In the control condition, job access is framed as competitive and merit-based, highlighting the role of exams, individual ability, and the costs associated with job search. The experimental variation lies in how job access is framed. In the treatment conditions, the wording shifts to portray job access as more predictable and implicitly facilitated through informal channels, particularly through political network for public sector jobs. For parents, the scenarios embed the household’s decision over educational investments, while for students they focus on educational aspirations and career choices. Importantly, political connections are not explicitly mentioned, especially for students, allowing participants to infer the role of networks indirectly.

By randomizing these informational environments, the intervention identifies how beliefs about job access—rather than observed connections themselves—shape expectations and forward-looking decisions prior to labor-market entry.

Experimental design

We test whether perceived access to political connections shapes educational investment, student effort, and career choices prior to labor-market entry. We expect that households exposed to information suggesting that job access is facilitated through networks will be more likely to orient students toward public-sector careers. Because these jobs still require minimum educational credentials, we also expect higher incentives to invest in education and exert effort to meet these thresholds. Finally, we expect the treatment to shift beliefs about labor markets, making public-sector jobs appear more accessible and less costly to obtain.

To test these hypotheses, we implement a randomized control trial with households in Benin. The study targets households with at least one adult household head and one student aged 15 or older. Within each household, we interview one household head and one randomly selected eligible student, allowing us to jointly capture parental decisions and student responses.

Households are randomly assigned to one of two study conditions, with randomization conducted at the household level and blocked by village to ensure balance across local environments. Assigning treatment at the household level ensures that both the household head and the student are exposed to the same informational environment, thereby avoiding conflicting signals within the household and preserving the coherence of decision-making.

In the competition-based labor-market condition, which serves as the control group, respondents receive vignettes describing a labor market in which job access depends on academic performance, exam success, qualifications, and the costs of job search. In the political-connection condition, respondents receive parallel vignettes in which job access appears more predictable and implicitly facilitated through informal networks, particularly for public-sector employment. Importantly, the relationship between political connections and public sector employment is never mentioned; instead, the treatment varies how job access is described, allowing participants to infer the role of networks indirectly.

We then measure a set of primary and secondary outcomes immediately following the information treatment. For parents, primary outcomes capture educational investment and career orientation for their child, while for students they include career choices and intended academic effort. Secondary outcomes, measured for both groups, capture beliefs about labor-market conditions, including perceived job access, job-search costs, and fairness in hiring across sectors. Together, these outcomes allow us to evaluate how changes in perceived job access influence behavior and beliefs prior to labor-market entry.

Design details

Randomization method
We implement randomization directly in the field as part of a nationally representative survey of 1,862 households. We first randomly select 62 villages across regions and then randomly select 30 households within each village. After collecting background information on households and household heads, we assign households to study conditions using the household head’s month of birth. Households whose heads were born in even-numbered months—February, April, June, August, October, and December—are assigned to the political-connection vignette, while households whose heads were born in odd-numbered months are assigned to the competition-based labor-market vignette. This procedure assigns treatment at the household level, ensuring that both the household head and the selected student receive the same vignette. Birth months are unrelated to the experimental outcomes, and each household has a one-half probability of assignment to either the treatment or control condition.
Randomization unit
Households
Clusters
1865 households
Observations
1865 households
Arms
Given the direct in-the-field randomization nature of the experiment, we use simple randomization procedure and do not know yet how many households will fall in the treatment group and how many will be assigned to control group. We will have this information at the end of the field work, which is ongoing.
Primary outcomes
Parents: Investment in Children and Career Orientations Students: Career choices and School Performance
Secondary outcomes
Students: Job Prospects and Search Costs across sectors, Perception about labor market fairness

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Keywords