Why do economists adhere to the practice of alphabetical author ordering? Theory and Experimental Evidence
How to cite
Fan, Simon. 2026. "Why do economists adhere to the practice of alphabetical author ordering? Theory and Experimental Evidence." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0018670. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.18670-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
Alphabetical authorship has long been the prevailing convention in the field of economics. However, despite some papers addressing this topic, there is limited theoretical research dedicated to it. This project aims to conduct a comprehensive theoretical and empirical investigation into the subject. Our main argument is that alphabetical authorship provides a significant advantage to all authors involved in a joint paper. Reversing the alphabetical author order, although potentially beneficial to the first author, may be perceived as unfair to other authors. Consequently, other authors might contribute less to the paper, even when their costs are minimal. This situation could lead to the first author bearing the majority of the workload, which may negatively impact the overall quality of the work. Therefore, individuals may often find it in their best interest not to reverse alphabetical author ordering, even if they possess the initial idea of a project and have sufficient bargaining power to do so. We will test our theoretical predictions through laboratory experiments.
Intervention
We plan to conduct our laboratory experiments using university students in China, a widely adopted approach in related literature. Participants will be recruited through university bulletin board systems and online posters.
Experimental design
Based on what is described in "Randomization Method" below, this project will develop a two-person multi-period strategic interaction model, derive the Nash equilibrium solutions, and investigate the technical conditions under which the following four hypotheses hold.
Hypothesis 1: Compared with A, B is more likely to choose to write alone (i.e., not invite a collaborator in Stage 2).
Hypothesis 2: When B has the idea and invites A to be the second author, A may reject the collaboration even if A’s outside option payoff is lower than the payoff from collaboration.
Hypothesis 3: When B has the idea and invites A to be the second author, A may choose to put in no effort in the co-authorship even if A has higher productivity.
Hypothesis 4: When A’s outside option payoff is lower than A’s payoff from being the second author, B may choose to list the authorship in alphabetical order.
Moreover, we plan to have the following additional treatments.
1. Player chooses authorship ordering & effort is costly
2. Player chooses authorship ordering & effort is costless
3. Authorship ordering is randomly determined & effort is costly
4. Authorship ordering is randomly determined & effort is costless
5. Player chooses authorship ordering & effort is costly & authorship is being observed by third party.
6. Player chooses authorship ordering & effort is costless & authorship is being observed by third party.
Design details
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