Reciprocity, Accountability, and the Fiscal Social Contract

How to cite

Prete, Anna Lo. 2026. "Reciprocity, Accountability, and the Fiscal Social Contract." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0018669. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.18669-1.0

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Anna Lo Prete*

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0018669
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.18669-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2026-06-18 – 2026-06-30
Countries
Private
JEL codes
D72, D91, H26, H41, I21
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/18669

Abstract

This study investigates whether support for the fiscal social contract is shaped not only by reciprocal exchange between taxes and public goods, but also by citizens’ perceived ability to monitor and discipline governments through democratic accountability.

The project implements a three-arm randomized online survey experiment in Italy. Participants are assigned to a no-text control condition, a reciprocity treatment, or a democratic accountability treatment.

The study examines whether these treatments affect beliefs about the fiscal social contract, fiscal legitimacy, democratic accountability, political participation and collective contribution behavior.

Intervention

The study implements a three-arm randomized online survey experiment. Participants are randomly assigned to one of the following conditions:
- Control: No-text control condition.
- Treatment 1: Reciprocity narrative emphasizing collective financing and public goods provision.
- Treatment 2: Democratic accountability narrative emphasizing democratic delegation and electoral accountability,.

Experimental design

The study is a between-subjects randomized online survey experiment implemented through Qualtrics.

Participants are randomly assigned to one of three conditions:
- Control group: no-text condition.
- Reciprocity treatment: emphasizes reciprocal exchange between taxes and public goods provision.
- Accountability treatment: emphasizes democratic monitoring, delegation, voting, and electoral accountability.

The survey structure is:
- pre-treatment measures;
- treatment exposure;
- attitudinal outcomes;
- behavioral and quasi-behavioral outcomes;
- demographic variables.

Randomization occurs at the individual level.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization is implemented automatically through the Qualtrics randomizer using computer-generated pseudo-random assignment at the individual respondent level.
Randomization unit
Individual respondent
Clusters
Approximately 1,800 individual respondents.
Observations
Approximately 1,800 individual respondents.
Arms
Approximately one-third of respondents will be assigned to each experimental condition.
Primary outcomes
Primary outcomes consist of post-treatment measures of fiscal legitimacy, democratic accountability, and collective contribution behavior.
Secondary outcomes
Secondary outcomes include additional measures related to political participation and exit-versus-voice attitudes that may be analyzed separately in future work.

Cited by

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Keywords