Mental Models of Incentives

How to cite

Detemple, Julian. 2026. "Mental Models of Incentives." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0018622. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.18622-1.2

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Julian Detemple*

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0018622
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.18622-1.2
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2026-05-13 – 2026-12-31
Countries
Private
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/18622

Abstract

This study characterizes MBA students' mental models of monetary incentives, meaning their subjective beliefs about how different compensation contracts affect employee behavior.

Experimental design

The study population is MBA students at one of the leading global business schools who participate in one of two course in May 2026 and consent to use of their data for research.

The survey is distributed as a mandatory homework assignment that students complete as a teaching exercise

Mental models of incentives are measured by eliciting beliefs in the context of a principal-agent vignette. A between-subject priming treatment studies the influence of salient intrinsic motivation on mental models.
In addition, respondents complete a contract adoption task and provide additional background information through a survey. The adoption task implements a stylized contract-choice experiment based on Falk and Kosfeld. Respondents choose whether to impose a minimum-effort rule and choose an unconditional wage.

Design details

Randomization method
Treatment assignment is computerized in the oTree survey software. The allocation is 30% treatment and 70% control. The survey software sorts participants by start time of the survey and assigns treatment in blocks of 10, with 7 control assignments and 3 treatment assignments randomly shuffled within each block. Separately, the contract selected for the open-ended reasoning question is randomized with weights that oversample theoretically informative responses. This randomization affects only which explanation is elicited.
Randomization unit
Individual student-level
Clusters
Not applicable, since no clustered treatment assignment
Observations
Expected n = 100 to 150 MBA students. The realized sample depends on class attendance and consent.
Arms
30% treatment and 70% control. With an expected total sample size of n = 100 to 150, this implies approximately 30 to 45 respondents in treatment and 70 to 105 respondents in control.
Primary outcomes
- Respondents' effort beliefs in the MidCorp incentives vignette. - Four prespecified binary mental-model components derived from those effort beliefs. - Behavioral index summarizing the four mental-model components.
Secondary outcomes
- Open-ended reasoning about one contract response, used as a supporting qualitative and mechanism measure. - Contract choice in an incentivized experiment based on Falk and Kosfeld (2006, Hidden Costs of Control). - Exploratory contract rankings from the vignette.

Cited by

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Keywords