Historical segregation, neighborhood social capital, and human capital accumulation
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Woo-Mora, L. Guillermo.
2026. "Historical segregation, neighborhood social capital, and human capital accumulation." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0018600.
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.18600-1.0
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This study examines whether making neighborhood identity salient affects parents' willingness to invest in their children's education. I recruit approximately 250 parents or primary caregivers with children aged 6-20 from neighborhoods near a historical boundary in Guadalajara, Mexico, where in prior research I have documented persistent educational gaps linked to 16th-century colonial segregation.
Participants complete a Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism eliciting their willingness to pay for online math tutoring for their child. I randomize whether an interactive map-drawing exercise (which makes neighborhood boundaries salient) occurs before or after this educational choice. This allows me to test whether activating neighborhood salience reduces educational investment.
I pre-register three hypotheses: (1) the salience treatment reduces demand and willingness to pay for tutoring on average; (2) this effect is concentrated in the historically marginalized neighborhood (Analco) where prior survey evidence shows high localized trust but low institutional confidence; (3) the effect is stronger among individuals who report high neighborhood orientation (measured through trust in neighbors and identification with their neighborhood).
The study tests a mechanism linking historical segregation, neighborhood social capital, and persistent educational inequality.
Intervention
Participants are randomly assigned to one of two arms:
TREATMENT (Map-First): An interactive map-drawing exercise is administered BEFORE the main outcome elicitation. Participants view a satellite map centered on their household and draw the boundary of their neighborhood (colonia/barrio), then briefly explain their boundary choice.
CONTROL (Map-After): The identical map-drawing exercise is administered AFTER the main outcome elicitation.
Both arms complete the same modules; only the timing of the map-drawing exercise varies. This design tests whether making neighborhood boundaries cognitively salient affects educational investment decisions.
Randomization occurs at the household level with 1:1 allocation, stratified by geographic location (Analco vs Poniente neighborhoods).
Experimental design
This is a two-arm randomized controlled trial testing whether making neighborhood boundaries cognitively salient affects parents' willingness to invest in their children's education.
Participants complete a survey including: (1) an interactive map-drawing exercise in which they trace their neighborhood boundary, and (2) a Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism eliciting willingness to pay for educational tutoring.
Treatment arm: Map-drawing occurs BEFORE the educational investment elicitation Control arm: Map-drawing occurs AFTER the educational investment elicitation
The design tests whether activating awareness of neighborhood boundaries reduces revealed willingness to pay for tutoring, and whether this effect differs by geographic location and by individual neighborhood orientation.
Target sample: ~250 parents/caregivers with children aged 6-20, recruited from neighborhoods near a historical boundary in Guadalajara, Mexico.
Design details
Randomization method
Computer-based randomization within survey software (SurveyToGo) at survey start, before any modules are administered.
Fair binary draw assigns each household to Map-First (treatment) or Map-After (control) with equal probability using SurveyToGo's built-in random number generator.
Assignment revealed to enumerator only when software prompts the corresponding module sequence.
Stratification implicit through geographic quotas: 180 households in Analco, 70 in Poniente. Within each area, randomization is unconstrained.
Randomization unit
Individual household. Each household receives an independent random assignment to treatment or control with no further clustering.
Clusters
Not applicable. Randomization occurs at the household level with no clustering. The design uses geographic stratification (Analco vs Poniente) but treatment is assigned individually to each household, not at the cluster level.
Observations
~ 250 households total
- ~200 households in Analco (eastern side of historical boundary)
- ~50 households in Poniente (western side of historical boundary)
Arms
Total n=250 households with 1:1 randomization to Map-First vs Map-After:
ANALCO (n=200):
- Treatment (Map-First): 100 households
- Control (Map-After): 100 households
PONIENTE (n=50):
- Treatment (Map-First): 25 households
- Control (Map-After): 25 households
OVERALL (n=250):
- Treatment (Map-First): 125 households
- Control (Map-After): 125 households
Primary outcomes
The primary outcome is willingness to pay for educational investment, measured through a Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) incentive-compatible mechanism using a Multiple Price List (MPL) design.
Primary outcome variables:
1. Count of rows (out of 11) where respondent chose one hour of online math tutoring over an Amazon gift card (range: 0-11)
2. Willingness to pay estimate (in MXN pesos) constructed following the method in Jack, McDermott, & Sautmann (2022), which accounts for randomization of MPL rows and columns
Jack, B. K., McDermott, K., & Sautmann, A. (2022). Multiple price lists for willingness to pay elicitation. Journal of Development Economics, 159, 102977. https://doi.org/10.1016/J.JDEVECO.2022.102977
Secondary outcomes
Secondary outcomes are organized into three categories:
1. NARRATIVE MECHANISMS (open-ended responses):
- Coded reasons for why young people in the neighborhood stop studying (open-ended question)
- Categories coded from responses: economic necessity, family obligations, perceived low returns, peer influences, neighborhood-specific factors, institutional barriers
2. MODEL PRIMITIVES:
Neighborhood orientation:
- Standardized trust in neighbors minus average trust in family, coworkers, and strangers (continuous, standardized)
- Agreement with "I feel part of this colonia/barrio" (1-7 Likert scale)
- Amount allocated to in-group in disinterested dictator game (0-500 MXN)
Network benefit:
- Which family receives more help from neighbors in emergency - Martínez (stays local) vs Ramírez (leaves for university)? (binary: Martínez=1, Ramírez=0)
- Number of times in past year received help from neighbors in emergencies/loans/job-finding (count, 0-3)
Time/security substitution:
- Typical hours per week spent in neighborhood activities (continuous)
Conformity costs:
- trajectory_social_cost_vignette: Which trajectory creates more difficulty maintaining good relations with neighbors - Martínez (stays) vs Ramírez (leaves)? (binary: Ramírez=1, Martínez=0)
- perceived_peer_disapproval: Expected negative reaction from neighbors if child pursues university away from neighborhood (Likert scale)
3. ALTERNATIVE MECHANISMS:
Intergenerational Educational Mobility:
- Mother and father educational levels
Returns to education (perceived):
- Difference in expected age-30 income for university graduate vs high school graduate from respondent's neighborhood (continuous, MXN)
- Minimum income that would justify cost of university (continuous, MXN)
Beliefs and norms:
- "Of every 10 families in your neighborhood, how many would choose tutoring over 100 MXN gift card?" (0-10)
- Personal agreement with "Young people should work after high school rather than continue studying" (1-7 Likert)
- Belief about share of neighbors who would agree with above statement (proportion)
Aspirations:
- Highest educational level parent wants focal child to complete (categorical)
- Highest level parent realistically expects focal child to complete (categorical)
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