Communication in Bargaining under the Shadow of Conflict
How to cite
Huang, Lingbo. 2026. "Communication in Bargaining under the Shadow of Conflict." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0018563. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.18563-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
We experimentally study how pre-play communication shapes bargaining under the shadow of conflict when one party is privately informed about her fighting strength. Building on a two-stage model, we ask: when private information about fighting strength is one-sided, does one-way unverified communication facilitate agreement, or does it instead sustain strategic misrepresentation in the form of bluffing (weak types posing as strong) and feigning weakness (strong types posing as weak)? The model predicts both forms of misrepresentation in equilibrium and yields point predictions on demand frequencies, conflict rates, and posterior beliefs.
Intervention
We implement a 3x2 between-subjects design. The three asymmetric-information environments are crossed with the presence/absence of one-way pre-play communication from Player~1 to Player~2, yielding six treatment cells
Experimental design
We summarize the elements of the model needed to define the experimental design Two risk-neutral players play a two-stage game with prize V=1000. In Stage~1 they simultaneously submit demands; if compatible, the pie is split as demanded, otherwise the game proceeds to Stage~2, a conflict in which Player~1's effort cost is fixed at c_1=80 and Player~2 chooses between low (c_L=80) and high (c_H=180) effort. Winning probabilities for Player~1 are (p_W^L,p_W^H,p_S^L,p_S^H)=(1/2,9/20,7/8,3/4), where the W/S index denotes weak/strong Player~1 type and L/H denotes Player~2's effort. Player~1 is strong with prior probability \pi (only she observes her type). Three asymmetric-information environments are studied: 1) Bluffing PBE: symmetric demand menu {200,500,800} for both players, prior \pi=3/5.
2) Feigning PBE: asymmetric demand menus, Player~1 from {200,650,800} and Player~2 from {200,350,800}, with d^1_M=650 and d^2_M=350; prior \pi=3/5. 3) Feigning PBE under alternative prior: same demand menus and payoffs as (2) but with prior lowered to \pi=3/10. We implement a $3\times 2$ between-subjects design. The three asymmetric-information environments above are crossed with the presence/absence of one-way pre-play communication from Player~1 to Player~2, yielding six treatment cells.
Design details
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