The Role of Pay Transparency in Migrants’ Labor Market Integration
How to cite
Illing, Hannah; Stips, Felix; Jacoby, Annette. 2026. "The Role of Pay Transparency in Migrants’ Labor Market Integration." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0018556. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.18556-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
We plan to study the impact of wage information on migrants' labor market integration in Germany. For this purpose, we conduct a wage information experiment embedded in a novel panel survey of newly arriving migrants, sampled through Germany's consular services portal before their move and followed up after arrival. The experiment provides treated migrants with information on average wages in their local labor market and occupation. We are particularly interested in whether access to wage information affects migrants' reservation wages, and their job switching and wage negotiation intentions. By linking survey data to administrative records, we will be able to trace how information provision shapes both intended and realized labor market trajectories.
Intervention
We collect data in an online survey experiment in which respondents are randomly provided with information on average wages in their 3-digit occupation, gender, age, education, and commuting zone, following a similar setup as in Jäger et al. (2024).
We study: (i) whether receiving the information treatment affects respondents' reservation wages, wage expectations, firm switching, and wage negotiation intentions; (ii) whether receiving the information treatment affects respondents' realized outcomes in the German social security data.
The experiment takes place in the second wave of a large survey of recent migrants to Germany, conducted by the Institute for Employment Research (IAB). We incentivize participation in the survey with a €10 voucher, which respondents receive at the end of the survey.
Experimental design
Among respondents who are interested in receiving wage information, we randomly allocate half of the participants to each treatment arm:
(i) Treatment group: respondents receive information about the average wage of observationally similar workers.
(ii) Control group: respondents do not receive the information.
The intervention closely follows the experiment of Jäger et al. (2024). The information is visualized as a bar chart. Alongside the treatment, we also show respondents' guess of the wage of similar workers as well as their (reservation) wage. The control group only sees these two bars, while the treatment group also sees the bar with the actual average wage. Observationally similar workers are workers in the same 3-digit occupation who are full-time employed and have the same gender, age, education, and commuting zone. We clearly state this when providing the wage information.
We stratify by employment status (non-employed, part-time employed, full-time employed). The intervention shown to each group is identical except that (i) for non-employed workers, the wage of similar workers also conditions on having been non-employed for a similar period of time, and (ii) for non-employed and part-time employed workers, we do not show their current wage but rather their pre-intervention reservation wage, since no information on their full-time wage is available.
Design details
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