Why Don't Farmers Insure? Sunk-Cost Perception and the Demand for Agricultural Insurance
How to cite
Flores, Francisco. 2026. "Why Don't Farmers Insure? Sunk-Cost Perception and the Demand for Agricultural Insurance." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0018551. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.18551-2.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
Smallholder farmers face substantial production risk, yet their adoption of agricultural insurance remains persistently low. This project studies an overlooked behavioral mechanism behind this puzzle: farmers perceive the insurance premium as "wasted" money when no loss occurs. In a lab-in-the-field experiment with smallholder grape growers in Northern Peru, participants make incentivized adoption decisions over two risk-management tools: insurance, which charges a premium in every state, and an emergency loan, which charges only when a loss occurs — so its cost can never feel wasted. Both tools are offered at full cost and with an identical proportional (50%) cost reduction. If the wasted-premium perception depresses insurance demand, the cost reduction should raise insurance adoption by more than it raises emergency-loan adoption. We then use these adoption decisions to estimate a structural model of tool choice in which a single parameter captures disutility from the premium in the no-loss state, and test the null that this parameter is zero. The results speak to a broader challenge in agricultural development — designing financial products farmers actually use — by distinguishing whether low take-up reflects low demand for risk protection itself, or a mismatch between product design and farmer decision-making.
Intervention
The intervention is the offer of a risk-management tool, with five conditions tested within-subject. Each participant — a smallholder grape grower in the district of Cascas, region La Libertad, Northern Peru — faces a sequence of simulated two-season crop production decisions under weather risk, organized in five blocks of four rounds. In each round, the participant is shown the probability of a good harvest year. In the first four conditions, the participant is offered a single tool, which they may accept or decline:
Insurance (I). Premium α is deducted from harvest revenue; an indemnity is paid if the year is bad.
Emergency Loan (EL). A loan is disbursed if the year is bad; it is repaid with interest δ in the following season (which is deterministically good).
Cheap Insurance (CI). Identical to Insurance, but the premium is reduced to Jα with J = 1/2, framed to the participant as a 50% subsidy on the premium. Indemnity unchanged.
Cheap Emergency Loan (CEL). Identical to Emergency Loan, but the interest is reduced to Jδ with J = 1/2, framed as a 50% subsidy on the interest. Loan amount unchanged.
Head-to-Head (HH). The participant is shown Insurance and Emergency Loan side by side, both at full (unsubsidized) cost, and chooses which of the two tools to use for that round; there is no opt-out. This block yields a direct revealed-preference ranking between the two tools, complementing the accept/decline margin of conditions 1–4.
The proportional cost reduction (J = 1/2) is identical across CI and CEL by design, so the expected-cost reductions induced by "cheapening" each tool are matched. This proportional symmetry is what suggests the wasted-premium mechanism: if the adoption gap between Insurance and Emergency Loans is driven by the premium being perceived as "wasted" money when no loss occurs, the gap should not be the same when both tools are made cheaper by the same proportion.
Participants receive a fixed payment plus a performance-based payment determined by the profit earned in a single round drawn at random — by a physical draw the participant observes — from all rounds played. The performance payment increases linearly at a pre-specified rate per sol of profit above a threshold, with the threshold set below the lowest attainable profit so the variable payment is always positive and every outcome remains payoff-relevant. (Amended 2026-08-11: the original rule, linear in total profit with no threshold, left too little payment variation across choices; see amendment history.) Working capital is provided at the start of each round, so liquidity is never a binding constraint. The instrument is a custom Spanish-language HTML survey that runs fully offline on Android tablets.
Experimental design
Within-subject crossover lab-in-the-field experiment. The five conditions described under Intervention are the five levels of a within-subject factor; each participant is exposed to all five.
Block structure. Each participant plays R = 20 rounds, organized into K = 5 blocks of r = 4 consecutive rounds. Within a block the offered condition is held fixed; between blocks it changes. In four of the blocks the participant accepts or declines a single tool (I, EL, CI, CEL); in the fifth (Head-to-Head), the participant chooses which of the two full-cost tools — Insurance or Emergency Loan — to use in each round. The order of the five blocks varies across participants (see Randomization Method below).
Within-block variation. Within each block, the four rounds vary the probability of a good harvest year over the grid θ^H ∈ {0.3, 0.4, 0.6, 0.9}, presented in randomized order. Probability is shown to the participant before each decision. Probability is a source of within-subject, within-block variation; it is not a treatment dimension.
Round structure. Each round has a two-season horizon. Season-1 yield is high (Y^H) with probability θ^H and low (Y^L) with probability 1 − θ^H. Season-2 yield is high deterministically. The Season-1 outcome is realized by the participant drawing blindly from an opaque bag of 10 colored balls whose color mix is set, round by round, to match the displayed probability; the round selected for the performance-based payoff is drawn from an opaque bag at the end of the session. Both draws are physical and observable by the participant — to support trust in the randomness of payoff-relevant events.
Identification. The within-subject design absorbs all time-invariant individual heterogeneity through individual fixed effects. Round fixed effects absorb fatigue/learning across the global round counter. The Williams-balanced block-order assignment (see Randomization Method) ensures that block-position effects and first-order carryover are orthogonal in expectation to the treatment contrasts. The primary analysis is a pooled linear-probability regression of the binary accept indicator on condition dummies (Insurance is the omitted reference) over the four accept/decline conditions, with individual and round fixed effects, and standard errors clustered at the participant level. The Head-to-Head block's outcome — a binary indicator for choosing Insurance over the loan — does not enter this regression; it is analyzed separately as a direct revealed-preference measure between the two tools. The confirmatory sample comprises participants who played under the revised performance-payment rule (from 2026-08-12); data collected in the first fieldwork weekend under the original payment rule are classified as pilot and reported separately, with a pooled robustness specification including a payment-rule indicator.
Design details
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