Who Gives a Dime? Experimental evidence on first-movers in fundraising mechanisms.
How to cite
Hofmann, Jakob; Onderstal, Sander. 2026. "Who Gives a Dime? Experimental evidence on first-movers in fundraising mechanisms.." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0018545. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.18545-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
Charitable fundraising campaigns increasingly use first-movers and visibility tools to exploit social image and strategic concerns, but such tools may also induce pressure to give and crowd out intrinsic motivation. We investigate in a laboratory experiment how the timing structure affects giving behavior across three fundraising mechanisms: a voluntary contribution mechanism, a lottery and an all-pay auction. We ask whether observing a first-mover affects individual contributions and public good provision level in a 3×2 within- and between-subject design where first-movers are determined at random in each group. We use the strategy method to enhance the number of statistically independent observations and to elicit complete contribution profiles of second-movers. This allows us identify different types of (conditional) cooperators. Additionally, first-order beliefs provide evidence on the consistency of conditional attitudes and elicited beliefs with contributions of the different types. Finally, we let participants vote for their preferred mechanism at the end of the experiment.
Intervention
We vary the use of prize mechanisms to increase individual contributions to a public goods game in the simultaneous and sequential setting. The control treatment is the voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM) with no prize. The treatments are a pay-your-bid lottery (LOT) and all-pay auction (APA) with an equally sized prize.
Experimental design
The experiment combines a between-subjects design across prize mechanisms (VCM, LOT, APA), assigned at the session level, with a within-subject design across timing structures, as every participant plays both the simultaneous (SIM) and sequential (SEQ) protocol within each round. Groups of three are randomly rematched every round. The sequential protocol uses the strategy method, eliciting a complete conditional response schedule from every participant before roles are assigned. Incentivized beliefs are collected after each decision. Payment is determined by a scheme in which one decision round and one prediction round are drawn at the end of the session, applying equally to all participants and preventing hedging. A final incentive-compatible majority vote determines a bonus round. With one session per treatment the study is exploratory in nature.
Design details
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