Misperceptions, Protest Norms, and Democratic Stability: How Cross-Partisan Beliefs Shape Political Violence in Post-Authoritarian

How to cite

Takahashi, Ryo; Higashida, Keisaku; Higuchi, Yuki. 2026. "Misperceptions, Protest Norms, and Democratic Stability: How Cross-Partisan Beliefs Shape Political Violence in Post-Authoritarian." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0018515. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.18515-2.1

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Ryo Takahashi* , Keisaku Higashida , Yuki Higuchi

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0018515
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.18515-2.1
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2026-05-04 – 2026-08-31
Countries
Private
JEL codes
D72, D83, P0, O12
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/18515

Abstract

In many developing countries, elections are often accompanied by political violence. A recurring pattern is the escalation of protest beyond its initial target—from resistance against the government to attacks on civilians, media organizations, and private property. We term this grievance-exceeding protest, distinguishing it from grievance-directed protest targeting government actors. Using the case of Bangladesh’s 2024 uprising, we hypothesize that the perceived success of such escalation may have embedded grievance-exceeding protest into citizens’ democratic norms.
We argue that misperceptions about political opponents sustain this norm: citizens overestimate opponents’ tolerance for grievance-exceeding protest, generating a security-dilemma dynamic in which both sides retain violent means. We test this using a two-wave online survey experiment with 3,000 respondents following Bangladesh’s February 2026 election. Respondents receive randomized information about opponents’ actual intolerance for grievance-exceeding protest, including a common-knowledge treatment. Outcomes include list experiments on protest norms, a public declaration measure, an NPO donation coordination game, and a cross-partisan public goods game.

Experimental design

We conduct a two-wave online survey experiment with 3,000 respondents in Bangladesh following the February 2026 election. In Wave 1, we measure baseline beliefs and attitudes. In Wave 2, respondents are randomly assigned to receive information about political groups’ attitudes toward protest, including (i) out-group information, (ii) in-group information, (iii) both, (iv) both with a common knowledge statement, (v) placebo information on a non-political topic, or (vi) no information.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization done in the field by a computer
Randomization unit
Individual
Clusters
3000 individuals
Observations
3000 individuals
Arms
500 individuals per arm
Primary outcomes
List experiment (Exceeding). We measure support for grievance-exceeding protest using a list experiment. The outcome is the difference in mean item counts between a treatment list that includes a sensitive item—whether exceeding protest can be a legitimate part of democracy—and a control list that excludes it. Declaration Tier 1. We measure respondents’ willingness to publicly reject grievance-exceeding protest using a declaration exercise. The outcome is the share of respondents selecting Support, Oppose, or Abstain on a statement calling for resolving political grievances exclusively through democratic institutions and rejecting exceeding protest. Declaration Tier 2. Among respondents who select Support or Abstain in Tier 1, we measure willingness to make a public commitment. The outcome is the share consenting to have their first name displayed as a supporter of the declaration. 1st-order tolerance (post). We measure individual-level normative beliefs about grievance-exceeding protest. The outcome is agreement with the statement that exceeding protest cannot be justified as a form of political action. This direct measure asks essentially the same question as the list experiment’s sensitive item. Comparing the prevalence of disagreement from the list experiment with the share disagreeing on the direct question provides a test of whether respondents answer the direct question honestly (i.e., without social desirability bias). If the two estimates are statistically indistinguishable, the direct question can serve as a primary outcome with full statistical power, complementing the list experiment. NPO donation coordination game. We measure cross-partisan coordination on pro-democracy behavior using a binary donation game. Respondents decide whether to approve or disapprove a 100 BDT donation to an election-monitoring NGO (EWG), paired with a partner from an opposing political group. The outcome is the approval decision. The coordination game is preceded by an individual (unpaired) donation decision, allowing us to isolate the coordination component as the difference between individual and paired donation rates. Cross-partisan public goods game. We measure cooperative behavior with political opponents using a standard public goods game. Respondents are paired with an opposing-party participant and decide how much of a 100 BDT endowment to contribute to a shared account. Total contributions are increased by 50% and split equally. The outcome is the contribution amount.

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Keywords