Effects of group size on investment decisions & Inconsistent Risk Preferences

How to cite

Füllbrunn, Sascha; Luhan, Wolfgang. 2026. "Effects of group size on investment decisions & Inconsistent Risk Preferences." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0018505. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.18505-1.0

Download: BibTeX · RIS — for reference managers without a browser translator. Zotero and most others pick up this page's citation metadata directly.

Sascha Füllbrunn* , Wolfgang Luhan

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0018505
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.18505-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2026-05-10 – 2026-11-10
Countries
Private
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/18505

Abstract

The study consists of two distinct experiments that each participant will take part in.

Experiment 1 (Responsibility): This project studies how the size of the affected group influences decisions made on behalf of others. We implement a controlled online experiment in which the number of principals varies systematically while convex incentive structures are kept constant across conditions. This design isolates the effect of group size from payoff differences. Participants make decisions under risk for others across a wide range of group sizes, including large-scale settings. The approach enables a clean identification of how group size shapes responsibility and risk-taking.

Experiment 2 (Inconsistency): This study tests whether risk preferences elicited via the Gneezy–Potters investment task are consistent across different expected value conditions. In a within-subjects design, participants make investment decisions under three scenarios that vary only in expected returns while keeping the overall structure constant. The experiment randomizes condition order and pays out only one condition to limit hedging behavior. By comparing decisions across conditions, the design evaluates whether standard classifications of risk preferences remain stable. The results provide a direct assessment of the reliability of commonly used experimental risk measures.

Intervention

For experiment 1, we will vary the group size when making risky decisions for other participants using a within-subjects design. Between-subjects, we vary the order in which the group size will be presented.
For experiment 2, we will vary the expected value of a risky asset using a Gneezy-Potters (1997) experimental design within subjects. Between subjects, we vary the order in which the different treatments are presented.

Experimental design

Experiment 1: 101 participants will make risky decisions for other participants of varying group size using Qualtrics.
Experiment 2: 101 participants will make risky decisions for themselves with varying expected returns using Qualtrics.

Design details

Randomization method
The software programme Qualtrics will randomly allocate the participants to the treatments (1-5-10-20-50-100 and 100-50-20-10-5-1, and pos-zero-neg and neg-zero-pos in almost equal share.
Randomization unit
Student participant. They will use the same survey over all sessions such that the programme applies the randomisation to each session
Clusters
No clusters
Observations
101 participants (in the extreme case, 1 decision maker decides for 100 other participants)
Arms
There are always 50/51 participant in each order treatment but 101 participants for the within-subject design consideration.
Primary outcomes
Experiment 1: Principals have an endowment and the decision maker decides on how much to invest. The amount invested is the key outcome variable. Compared to earlier experiments on Prolific, we want to find out whether the laboratory environment reduces the social distance and therefore leads to a stronger group size effect, compared to a strong order effect of group sizes found in Prolific experiments.
Secondary outcomes
Experiment 2: The decision maker has an endowment to invest. The amount invested in the three environments POS, ZERO, and NEG are the three outcome variable. We have the following hypotheses: 1. Incentive Compatibility: Investment increases with expected value (Inv(POS)>INV(ZERO)>INV(NEG) 2. Stability of Risk Preferences: Risk-preference classifications inferred in the POS environment remain stable across environments. That is, if a participant is classified as risk-averse, risk-neutral, or risk-seeking in POS, the same classification should apply in ZERO and NEG. 3. Rank-Order Persistence: If individual risk-preference classifications are not stable across environments, the relative ordering of participants’ investment levels should still persist across POS, ZERO, and NEG.

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords