Disclosure and Hiring under Multidimensional Applicant Quality: A Laboratory Experiment
How to cite
Heggedal, Tom-Reiel. 2026. "Disclosure and Hiring under Multidimensional Applicant Quality: A Laboratory Experiment." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0018500. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.18500-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
In many markets, potential sellers (or applicants) can disclose information that is relevant to buyers' (employers') decisions. Classic unraveling logic asserts that when disclosure is costless and informative in a manner aligned with buyer value, all but the worst types disclose, and in the limit all types do so. We examine this logic in a controlled laboratory hiring game in which applicant quality is two-dimensional, but the test is informative about only one dimension. We contrast an environment with \emph{positive} correlation, where strong test performance aligns with employer value, and one with \emph{negative} correlation, where the alignment is only partial. In this way, the experiment provides a clean test of how multidimensional applicant quality shapes disclosure incentives and hiring decisions.
Intervention
We contrast an environment with positive correlation (where strong test performance aligns with employer value) and one with negative correlation (where the alignment is partial).
Experimental design
We contrast an environment with positive correlation (where strong test performance aligns with employer value) and one with negative correlation (where the alignment is partial).
Design details
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