Can Patients' Reports Improve Health Providers' Performance?

How to cite

Mbiti, Isaac; Serra, Danila. 2017. "Can Patients' Reports Improve Health Providers' Performance?." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0001844. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.1844-1.0

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Isaac Mbiti* , Danila Serra

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0001844
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.1844-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2013-08-01 – 2016-11-30
Countries
Kenya (Africa)
JEL codes
C90, I15, M59
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/1844

Abstract

We assess the effectiveness of accountability systems relying on patient reporting in the Kenyan health sector. We evaluate patients' willingness to file complaints on service providers, and providers' responsiveness to the possibility of receiving such complaints. We contrast reporting systems where complaints have no direct consequences on providers, such as standard complaint boxes, and reporting systems where complaints lead to either monetary penalties or non-monetary consequences, in the form of peer shaming. We employ a specially designed laboratory-in-the-field experiment involving randomly selected providers and patients from public and private health centers in Nairobi. We find that: 1) disclosing patients' complaints to providers' Health services, bottom-up accountability, patient reporting, peer shaming.professional peers is equally or more effective than imposing monetary penalties based on patients' complaints; 2) the possibility of retaliation against patients does not annul the effectiveness of reporting systems relying on peer shaming; 3) associating tangible consequences to complaints slightly lowers patients' willingness to file such complaints, mainly due to the existence of personal relationships with providers. Overall, our findings support the implementation of citizen reporting systems that leverage peer pressure and reputational concerns.

Intervention

In the Reporting Game, patient/provider pairs are randomly assigned to one of four treatment groups in which researchers manipulate the costs and incentives associated with patient complaints.

Complaint box: Complaints are private, and only shown to the provider who is complained about (no cost).

Monetary penalty: Providers face a monetary penalty if they receive a complaint.

Peer disclosure: Complaints about particular providers are shown to all providers in the workshop - imposing a social cost.

Peer disclosure with retaliation: Similar to the simple peer disclosure treatment, but providers also have the option to impose a retaliation penalty against the patient who complained about them.

Experimental design

Researchers conduct a lab-in-the-field experiment using a version of a standard trust game with patients and healthcare providers. In the "Reporting Game" patients are paired with health-workers, and patients must trust the provider; simulating the clinical interaction that generally occurs in the field. Patients can send money to providers and providers must decide how much of the tripled amount sent they want to return to the patient. Patients are then given the chance to file complaints against their matched provider on the basis of the money they receive back. The amount of money that providers send back to patients acts as a primary measure of health-worker behavior. A patient's decision to file a complaint, as a function of the amount returned by the provider, is the main measure of the patient's willingness to use participatory reporting systems.

Design details

Randomization method
As patients and providers arrived at the experimental workshops, they were invited to pick a badge with a green (providers) or an orange (patients) color and a number (1 to 5 for providers and 1 to 10 for patients).
Randomization unit
Workshop
Clusters
24 workshops
Observations
319 individuals (103 patients, 216 providers)
Arms
Complaint box: 5 workshops (24 providers, 50 patients) Monetary penalties: 6 workshops (26 providers, 52 patients) Peer disclosure: 7 workshops (27 providers, 58 patients) Peer disclosure with retaliation: 6 workshops (27 providers, 56 patients)
Primary outcomes
patients' trusting decisions, amount sent by patients in the trust game, providers' responsiveness to different reporting systems, amount returned by providers in the trust game, willingness to complain, intensity of complaints

Papers from this trial

  1. Mbiti, Isaac, and Danila Serra. "Can Patients’ Reports Improve Health Providers’ Performance? Experimental Evidence from Kenya." Working Paper, March 2017. https://www.povertyactionlab.org/sites/default/files/publications/5072_Can-Patients_Reports-Improve-Health-Providers-Performance_MbitiSerra29_March2017.pdf
  2. Mbiti, Isaac, and Danila Serra. "Can Patients' Reports Improve Health Providers' Performance? Experimental Evidence from Kenya." Working Paper, November 2016. https://faculty.smu.edu/dserra/KenyaPaper_MbitiSerra.pdf

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Keywords