Can Patients' Reports Improve Health Providers' Performance?
How to cite
Mbiti, Isaac; Serra, Danila. 2017. "Can Patients' Reports Improve Health Providers' Performance?." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0001844. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.1844-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
We assess the effectiveness of accountability systems relying on patient reporting in the Kenyan health sector. We evaluate patients' willingness to file complaints on service providers, and providers' responsiveness to the possibility of receiving such complaints. We contrast reporting systems where complaints have no direct consequences on providers, such as standard complaint boxes, and reporting systems where complaints lead to either monetary penalties or non-monetary consequences, in the form of peer shaming. We employ a specially designed laboratory-in-the-field experiment involving randomly selected providers and patients from public and private health centers in Nairobi. We find that: 1) disclosing patients' complaints to providers' Health services, bottom-up accountability, patient reporting, peer shaming.professional peers is equally or more effective than imposing monetary penalties based on patients' complaints; 2) the possibility of retaliation against patients does not annul the effectiveness of reporting systems relying on peer shaming; 3) associating tangible consequences to complaints slightly lowers patients' willingness to file such complaints, mainly due to the existence of personal relationships with providers. Overall, our findings support the implementation of citizen reporting systems that leverage peer pressure and reputational concerns.
Intervention
In the Reporting Game, patient/provider pairs are randomly assigned to one of four treatment groups in which researchers manipulate the costs and incentives associated with patient complaints.
Complaint box: Complaints are private, and only shown to the provider who is complained about (no cost).
Monetary penalty: Providers face a monetary penalty if they receive a complaint.
Peer disclosure: Complaints about particular providers are shown to all providers in the workshop - imposing a social cost.
Peer disclosure with retaliation: Similar to the simple peer disclosure treatment, but providers also have the option to impose a retaliation penalty against the patient who complained about them.
Experimental design
Researchers conduct a lab-in-the-field experiment using a version of a standard trust game with patients and healthcare providers. In the "Reporting Game" patients are paired with health-workers, and patients must trust the provider; simulating the clinical interaction that generally occurs in the field. Patients can send money to providers and providers must decide how much of the tripled amount sent they want to return to the patient. Patients are then given the chance to file complaints against their matched provider on the basis of the money they receive back. The amount of money that providers send back to patients acts as a primary measure of health-worker behavior. A patient's decision to file a complaint, as a function of the amount returned by the provider, is the main measure of the patient's willingness to use participatory reporting systems.
Design details
Papers from this trial
- Mbiti, Isaac, and Danila Serra. "Can Patients’ Reports Improve Health Providers’ Performance? Experimental Evidence from Kenya." Working Paper, March 2017. https://www.povertyactionlab.org/sites/default/files/publications/5072_Can-Patients_Reports-Improve-Health-Providers-Performance_MbitiSerra29_March2017.pdf
- Mbiti, Isaac, and Danila Serra. "Can Patients' Reports Improve Health Providers' Performance? Experimental Evidence from Kenya." Working Paper, November 2016. https://faculty.smu.edu/dserra/KenyaPaper_MbitiSerra.pdf
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