Online Dispute Resolution: value of bid revision, algorithmic closure, and mechanism transparency
How to cite
Hakimov, Rustamdjan; Kesten, Onur; Ozyurt, Selcuk; Liu, Tanzhou. 2026. "Online Dispute Resolution: value of bid revision, algorithmic closure, and mechanism transparency." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0018437. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.18437-2.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
This study examines how online dispute-resolution systems should be designed when a dispute can be reduced to a single compensation amount. Economic theory provides two natural benchmarks in this setting: direct bargaining and a structured one-shot ODR procedure based on the canonical sealed-bid mechanism. However, real platforms often add practical features such as bid revision after an impasse, algorithmic intervention when the parties’ requests are incompatible. These features are common in practice but are not well rationalized by standard bargaining theory, making their value an empirical question. In an online experiment, participants bargain over the division of 100 points while each has a private fallback amount if no agreement is reached. Participants are randomly assigned to Barg, ODR, SeqODR, or AlgODR. The main research questions are whether bid revision improves outcomes relative to one-shot ODR, whether algorithmic intervention improves outcomes when initial requests are incompatible. The study records agreement rates, final settlements, earnings, submitted requests, revised requests, and acceptance decisions.
Intervention
Participants are randomly assigned to one of four dispute-resolution procedures that differ in how settlements are reached after the two sides state how much of a fixed 100-point pie they want. Each participant has an outside option between 0 and 100, uniformlly drawn. Participant knows her outside option, but not the one of the opponent. Barg is direct bargaining without platform mediation. ODR is a one-shot structured procedure that converts the two requests into a nonbinding settlement recommendation when the requests are jointly feasible using second-best mechanism (Chaterjee and Samuelson,1983; Compte and Jehiel, 2009). SeqODR adds one opportunity to revise requests after an initial impasse. AlgODR allows the platform to use an internal rule to generate a compromise recommendation in some cases when the initial requests are incompatible.
Experimental design
This is an online experiment conducted on Prolific. Participants are randomly assigned to one of four treatment arms and remain in that arm for all four rounds. Within each treatment arm, participants are organized into groups of four and are randomly rematched into bargaining pairs in each round. In every round, a pair decides how to divide 100 points while each participant privately knows their own outside option, which is independently drawn from a uniform distribution between 0 and 100. One point equals £0.02.
We exclude participants who finish the round faster than 5 seconds.
Design details
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