Moral Repugnance and Artificial Intelligence
How to cite
Kurtis, Melisa; Chan, Alex. 2026. "Moral Repugnance and Artificial Intelligence." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0018405. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.18405-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
We study public preferences over delegating consequential decisions to artificial intelligence systems in a pre-registered 2x2 between-subjects survey experiment with approximately 1,500 U.S. adults. Respondents are randomly assigned to scenarios varying the decision domain (e.g., autonomous weapons versus AI judges) and governance structure (fully autonomous versus human oversight). We measure willingness to accept AI delegation across three dimensions: system performance, equal treatment, and cost savings. Primary outcomes include minimum acceptable improvements required for support (switching points), tradeoffs across dimensions, and a revealed-preference measure based on an incentivized donation task.
Intervention
Participants are randomly assigned to one of four treatment cells in a 2×2 between-subjects design. The first factor varies the domain: autonomous weapons systems versus AI judges. The second factor varies the governance structure of the AI system: fully autonomous AI (no real-time human involvement) versus AI with human oversight (a human authorizes or can override each decision).
Three within-cell order randomizations operate to protect against order effects: (i) the order of the two human-welfare decision parts is randomized; (ii) the order of the two cost-involving decision parts is randomized; (iii) the order of the no-cost decision block (human-welfare dimensions) and the cost decision block is randomized. In addition, within each cell, participants are randomized between-subjects to one of two subgroups (Group A and Group B) that differ in which human-welfare dimension is paired with cost in the cost-involving tradeoff scenarios. All other elicitations are identical across these subgroups.
Experimental design
Participants complete an online survey experiment designed to elicit preferences over the adoption of artificial intelligence (AI) in two high-stakes decision domains. Each participant is randomly assigned to one of four treatment cells in a 2×2 between-subjects design: domain (weapons systems vs. AI judges) crossed with governance structure (autonomous AI vs. AI with human oversight).
After a factual briefing on the assigned domain and a description of the two systems under comparison (the Status Quo of human decision-making vs. an Alternative System using AI), participants complete five sequential decision parts in which they choose between the Status Quo and the Alternative System across a series of scenarios.
Part 1 elicits baseline acceptance of the Alternative System at outcome parity (no stated outcome differences). Parts 2–5 elicit switching points and tradeoff frontiers across three outcome dimensions: military success/public safety, civilian protection/equal treatment across groups, and cost efficiency. In each part, participants face an escalating sequence of stated improvements on the relevant dimension (1%, 5%, 10%, 20%, 30%, with follow-up for those who reject at 30%), allowing us to identify each participant's minimum acceptable improvement (switching point) or to classify them as never-switchers. Switching points on each dimension are followed by adaptive tradeoff scenarios that measure the participant's frontier between dimensions.
After the decision parts, participants complete an incentivized donation task that provides a revealed-preference measure of opposition to AI. The research team has committed $100 to an organization advocating against AI deployment in the participant's domain (Stop Killer Robots for the weapons cells; Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law for the judges cells). The donation task uses a two-stage design with equalized expected bonus payments to cleanly separate indifference from preference intensity. One participant is randomly selected post-survey; their choice determines the actual donation amount and their bonus payment.
A consequentiality design strengthens incentive compatibility: participants are informed at the start that the study's results will be summarized in a letter sent to U.S. and international policymakers (state governors, U.S. senators and representatives, NATO leadership, and the UN First Committee for the weapons cells; state governors, senators and representatives, and state judicial authorities for the judges cells). One randomly selected policy scenario from the study is summarized in the letter.
The survey concludes with post-experiment measures, including moral assessment items, AI knowledge and attitudes (GAAIS-10), domain views, social consensus beliefs, institutional trust, personal experience, and demographics.
Design details
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