Something Always Sticks – Strategic Bullshit and the Reliance on Uninformed Sources
How to cite
Bechdolf, Mathilde Lea Editha; Sadrieh, Abdolkarim; Greif, Jannik Thomas. 2026. "Something Always Sticks – Strategic Bullshit and the Reliance on Uninformed Sources." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0018403. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.18403-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
Strategic bullshit, defined as uninformed, but goal-oriented communication, is assumed to affect the behavior of the recipients (Frankfurt 2005). We conduct lab experiments to assess, whether the strategic bullshit broadcasted by a sender can sway the participants in a common-pool resource (CPR) game to adapt their extraction levels. The CPR has an unknown tipping-point. If total extraction surpasses the tipping-point, the resource’s regeneration rate falls to a low level. The senders either receive a bonus, if the tipping-point is surpassed (“pro-depletion”), or if it is not surpassed (“pro-sustainability”). Hence, even if they are not informed on the tipping-point, the senders may attempt to communicate strategically to achieve their pro-depletion or pro-sustainability goal. The CPR participants are neither informed on the type of sender they are matched to, nor on the exact level of the tipping-point. However, in some treatments, the CPR participants know that the sender is not informed of the tipping-point (“uninformed sender”), while in others they know that the sender is informed (“informed sender”). Comparing the effect of the messages sent by the uninformed versus the informed senders, we can estimate the power of strategic bullshit.
Intervention
Participants take part in a common-pool resource (CPR) game in groups of three, in which they repeatedly decide how many units to extract from a shared resource with an unknown tipping point. Prior to the CPR game, groups listen to an audio message recorded by a sender. Participants are told that senders are financially incentivized to either promote depletion or sustainability of the resource, but are not informed about which incentive their specific sender faces. Participants are however told whether their sender was informed or uninformed about the tipping point. Groups play in total 4 CPR games with 15 periods each. Some groups receive no messages and serve as a baseline.
Experimental design
The experiment consists of three phases, each conducted in the laboratory with separate subject pools. In Phase 1, 40 speakers are recruited and each records messages for 6 scenarios, varying in the information available to the sender and the sender's financial incentives. In Phase 2, 36 raters evaluate 20 audio messages each, with each message rated by at least 3 raters. Raters are financially incentivized based on agreement with other raters. In Phase 3, 100 groups of 3 players (300 players total) participate in common-pool resource games. 20 groups serve as a control treatment and receive no audio messages.
Design details
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