Conflict and Tort Law

How to cite

Mittlaender, Sergio. 2026. "Conflict and Tort Law." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0018391. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.18391-1.0

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Sergio Mittlaender*

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0018391
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.18391-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2019-01-21 – 2021-11-05
Countries
Czechia (Prague)
JEL codes
K13, C91
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/18391

Abstract

Economic models of tort law explain how liability deters accidents, but not how it pacifies conflict. This article incorporates victims’ aggrievement, arising from harm and blame, and the behavioral responses that generate socially costly conflict into the model. Legal remedies shape injurers’ ex ante choices and victims’ ex post responses. Compensation acquires an independent welfare justification, the comparison between negligence and strict liability changes, negligence standards may track social norms rather than the Hand formula, and punitive damages, sanctions, and injunctions may improve welfare. A laboratory experiment shows that blame and harm each cause retaliation, while compensation substantially reduces it.

Experimental design

The experiment uses a between-subject design with three treatments: no liability, negligence, and strict liability. Participants are assigned to the role of injurer or victim and remain in that role throughout the experiment. They play a game in which injurers choose a level of care that reduces the victim’s loss if an accident occurs, and victims can retaliate against injurers through costly punishment. The treatments differ in the legal consequences of an accident. Under no liability, victims bear the loss. Under negligence, compensation is owed only if the injurer failed to meet the due-care threshold. Under strict liability, compensation is always owed when a loss occurs. In all treatments, victims can punish injurers at a cost. The experiment has two stages. First, subjects play a one-shot interaction, and victims’ punishment choices are elicited for all contingencies using the strategy method. Second, subjects are rematched with a different partner and play 19 repeated rounds in the same treatment, without the strategy method.

Design details

Randomization method
Treatment conditions were assigned ex ante at the session level via pre-programmed session treatments. Participants enrolled in the sessions without being informed of the assigned treatment. Within sessions, the computer randomly assigned participants to the role of injurer or victim
Randomization unit
Subjects and session
Clusters
18 experimental sessions
Observations
336 subjects
Arms
6 sessions and 112 subjects per treatment arm
Primary outcomes
retaliation

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords