Conflict and Tort Law
How to cite
Mittlaender, Sergio. 2026. "Conflict and Tort Law." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0018391. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.18391-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
Economic models of tort law explain how liability deters accidents, but not how it pacifies conflict. This article incorporates victims’ aggrievement, arising from harm and blame, and the behavioral responses that generate socially costly conflict into the model. Legal remedies shape injurers’ ex ante choices and victims’ ex post responses. Compensation acquires an independent welfare justification, the comparison between negligence and strict liability changes, negligence standards may track social norms rather than the Hand formula, and punitive damages, sanctions, and injunctions may improve welfare. A laboratory experiment shows that blame and harm each cause retaliation, while compensation substantially reduces it.
Experimental design
The experiment uses a between-subject design with three treatments: no liability, negligence, and strict liability. Participants are assigned to the role of injurer or victim and remain in that role throughout the experiment. They play a game in which injurers choose a level of care that reduces the victim’s loss if an accident occurs, and victims can retaliate against injurers through costly punishment. The treatments differ in the legal consequences of an accident. Under no liability, victims bear the loss. Under negligence, compensation is owed only if the injurer failed to meet the due-care threshold. Under strict liability, compensation is always owed when a loss occurs. In all treatments, victims can punish injurers at a cost. The experiment has two stages. First, subjects play a one-shot interaction, and victims’ punishment choices are elicited for all contingencies using the strategy method. Second, subjects are rematched with a different partner and play 19 repeated rounds in the same treatment, without the strategy method.
Design details
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