Incentives and lying in the cheating game

How to cite

Wellsjo, Alexandra; Gneezy, Uri; Phuchada, Sirikarn. 2026. "Incentives and lying in the cheating game." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0018366. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.18366-1.0

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Alexandra Wellsjo* , Uri Gneezy , Sirikarn Phuchada

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0018366
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.18366-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2026-04-24 – 2026-05-01
Countries
Private
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/18366

Abstract

We explore whether incentives affect lying in the die roll game.

Experimental design

We vary incentives in the die roll cheating game on prolific.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization by qualtrics into one of the 5 treatments
Randomization unit
individual
Clusters
NA
Observations
1250
Arms
250 prolific participants per treatment arm
Primary outcomes
Our primary outcome is the share of 5s reported. We interpret values above the expected value (1/6) as lying.
Secondary outcomes
self-reported lying/truth-telling, satisfaction with result, willingness to participate in the study again, clicking die roll link and switching away from survey tab, predictions about the reporting of others

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords