Collective Punishment and Self Governance in Public Good Provision
How to cite
Fan, Simon; Pang, Yu. 2026. "Collective Punishment and Self Governance in Public Good Provision." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0018347. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.18347-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
A substantial body of experimental research highlights the importance of penalizing free riders to sustain cooperation. However, subsequent experiments allowing for counter-punishment reveal that most free riders retaliate against their punishers, discouraging altruistic punishment and reducing the penalties for free riders over time. Some experimental economists, such as Nikiforakis (2008), argue that these findings cast doubt on Elinor Ostrom’s Nobel Prize-winning work on self-governance in common resource management. This project explores the ongoing debate on the effectiveness of self-governance by investigating a “collective punishment” mechanism, inspired by Ostrom (1990), to enhance cooperation through both theoretical and empirical approaches.
Our theoretical analysis develops a model where members of a community or group contribute their resources to a public good, guided by two social norms. Initially, the norm of contributing to the public good incentivizes higher contributions. Subsequently, the norm of penalizing those who stray from cooperation leads some individuals to embrace the role of “altruistic punishers.” We aim to investigate how collective punishment can engender a greater number of “altruistic punishers,” especially in the face of potential counter-punishment from non-cooperating members. Our objective is to scrutinize the principles underpinning “collective punishment” within the self-governance of a group or community, focusing on the hierarchical relationship between these two social norms. Subsequently, we will analyze the subgame perfect equilibrium of this mechanism design.
Regarding the empirical aspect, we plan to conduct laboratory experiments to test our theoretical conjectures. Participants will be randomly assigned to one of four treatments: (1) a control treatment featuring a standard public goods game, (2) an individual punishment treatment, (3) a collective punishment treatment without communication, and (4) a collective punishment treatment with communication.
It is crucial to emphasize that in “collective punishment,” the act of punishment is individually chosen and voluntarily executed, serving as a mechanism of self-governance. In this framework, the absence of an external authority to enforce penalties highlights the importance of credibility in determining the suggested donation amounts and levels of punishment within the mechanism design. Based on our theoretical analysis, we hypothesize that Group (4) will exhibit the highest level of cooperation. Additionally, we will investigate whether participants in Groups (3) and (4) can select donation and punishment amounts that are credible for individual implementation, as predicted by our theoretical analysis.
Intervention
The experiment is based on the voluntary contributions mechanism (VCM) game, which is widely used in the literature (Charness and Kuhn 2011). In this game of public good provision, the payoff to each member of a group, i, is as follows:
-e_i+θ (∑_1^N▒e_i )/N (12)
where is her total endowment, and e_i is her contribution to the public good. Concerning the correlation between theory and empirical results, it is crucial to recognize that earnings in laboratory experiments act as a substitute for "utility" in the theoretical framework.Note that Equation (6) is consistent with our theoretical model above in which u(x)=x and v(x)=θx. It is assumed that θ >1/N, which implies that the socially optimal outcome is e_i=. However, if an individual is entirely selfish, he/she will choose e_i=0 when N is large enough.
The participants in our experiment will be randomly assigned to one of the following four treatment groups:
The basic control treatment, in which the subjects will be asked to make their free choices of donating to the public good.
The individual punishment treatment: Participants in this group will have the option to impose monetary punishments on other group members. They can also seek revenge or counter-punishment after being punished.
The collective punishment treatment (without communications): In this group, participants will vote on several aspects, including the desired level of initial donation, the specific members to be punished based on their actual donations, and the monetary punishment to be imposed on free riders. Participants who are punished will have the opportunity for revenge.
The collective punishment treatment (with communications): In addition to the features in Group 3, participants in this group will be allowed to communicate with each other.
In all experimental groups, there is a two minutes’ deliberation on the proper donation amount to the public good. This discussion aims to ensure a consistent donation norm across all groups, with differences primarily arising from the methods of punishment rather than donation norms themselves. At the end of the discussion, there will be a voting on this amount, and the average of the voting outcome will be informed to all group members. Kessler and Leider (2012) and Krupka, Leider, Jiang (2017) demonstrate the importance of informal agreements in enforcing social norms. However, we hypothesize that the credibility of group members donating based on the average varies among different groups, with the group engaging in collective punishment more likely to conform to the average.
Experimental design
The participants in our experiment will be randomly assigned to one of the following four treatment groups:
1. The basic control treatment, in which the subjects will be asked to make their free choices of donating to the public good.
2. The individual punishment treatment: Participants in this group will have the option to impose monetary punishments on other group members. They can also seek revenge or counter-punishment after being punished.
3. The collective punishment treatment (without communications): In this group, participants will vote on several aspects, including the desired level of initial donation, the specific members to be punished based on their actual donations, and the monetary punishment to be imposed on free riders. Participants who are punished will have the opportunity for revenge.
4. The collective punishment treatment (with communications): In addition to the features in Group 3, participants in this group will be allowed to communicate with each other.
Three critical points should be highlighted. Firstly, in all experimental groups, there is a two minutes’ deliberation on the proper donation amount to the public good. This discussion aims to ensure a consistent donation norm across all groups, with differences primarily arising from the methods of punishment rather than donation norms themselves. At the end of the discussion, there will be a voting on this amount, and the average of the voting outcome will be informed to all group members. Kessler and Leider (2012) and Krupka, Leider, Jiang (2017) demonstrate the importance of informal agreements in enforcing social norms. However, we hypothesize that the credibility of group members donating based on the average varies among different groups, with the group engaging in collective punishment more likely to conform to the average.
Secondly, for the sake of experiment simplification, in our benchmark experiments described above we solely implement monetary penalties for free-riders in donations Nevertheless, we will integrate both non-monetary and monetary punishments in the extension of experiments later on.
Thirdly, the introduction of Treatment 4 underscores the significance of communication in collaborative settings, drawing inspiration from case studies in Ostrom (1990) and various experimental research endeavors (Levy, Padgitt, Peart, Houser, and Xiao 2011, Feltovich and Grossman 2015, Bartling, Valero, Weber, and Yao, forthcoming). As an illustration, Bartling, Valero, Weber, and Yao (forthcoming) conducted an experiment that featured an 8-minute interval allowing participants to communicate via an electronic chat window. They guided discussions on public discourse by encouraging participants to deliberate on the social acceptability or unacceptability of trading a product that negatively impacts third parties. Furthermore, participants were prompted to examine how trading this product aligns with or deviates from widely held norms regarding appropriate, ethical, and moral conduct. Participants were encouraged to freely express their opinions while refraining from personally identifying, obscene, or disparaging comments. The study revealed that such public discourse notably fosters socially responsible market behaviors. In our study, Treatments 3 and 4 diverge in terms of communication: Treatment 4 permits communication, while Treatment 3 does not. Similar to Bartling, Valero, Weber, and Yao (forthcoming), in Treatment 4 we will allow group members to communicate via an electronic chat window for 5 minutes before they take the possible actions against free riders. We hypothesize that Treatment 4 represents a more advanced approach to collective punishment compared to Treatment 3. Communication in Treatment 4 will occur prior to the implementation of punishments.
Design details
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