Low Promotability Tasks Among Young Parents

How to cite

Cloléry, Héloïse; Casarico, Alessandra. 2026. "Low Promotability Tasks Among Young Parents." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0018331. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.18331-1.0

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Héloïse Cloléry* , Alessandra Casarico

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0018331
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.18331-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2026-05-04 – 2026-12-31
Countries
Italy ()
JEL codes
J13; J16; M51; D90
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/18331

Abstract

Around the world, women continue to earn less than men and have worse labor market outcomes, and much of this gap emerges upon parenthood. One potential mechanism of penalties in the labour market for those parents that continue to work after childbirth is the unequal assignment and acceptance of low-promotability tasks, that is, tasks that benefit the organization but carry little weight in performance evaluations and promotion decisions.

This study examines whether gender and parenthood shape both the supply and the demand of low-promotability tasks in a broad working population. We implement a survey experiment in Italy with workers and managers. On the supply side, workers are given the opportunity to complete an optional task that benefits (mainly) students but does not affect their compensation. On the demand side, managers choose among worker profiles for this same task under alternative incentive schemes.

The study addresses two main questions. First, are women more likely than men to accept or be selected for a low-promotability task? Second, does parenthood, and in particular having a young child, affect these patterns differently for women and men?

Intervention

We conduct a two-stage survey experiment to study gender and parenthood differences in low-promotability tasks. Prior to the main experiment, we collect data from a separate pre-sample to generate reference responses used in a conformity task. In Stage 1, workers decide whether to complete an optional, unpaid task, which provides a behavioral measure of task acceptance. In Stage 2, managers choose among worker profiles in repeated, incentivized decisions to assign the same task under quantity and quality incentives. This design allows us to separately identify supply-side behavior and demand-side assignment patterns.

Experimental design

We conduct a two-stage survey experiment to study gender and parenthood differences in low-promotability tasks. Prior to the main experiment, we collect data from a separate pre-sample to generate reference responses used in a conformity task. In Stage 1, workers decide whether to complete an optional, unpaid task, which provides a behavioral measure of task acceptance. In Stage 2, managers choose among worker profiles in repeated, incentivized decisions to assign the same task under quantity and quality incentives. This design allows us to separately identify supply-side behavior and demand-side assignment patterns.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization done by a computer
Randomization unit
Individual level
Clusters
200 participants for the pre-sample. 500 workers for stage 1 of the main study. 250 managers for stage 2 of the main study.
Observations
500 observations for stage 1 7500 observations for stage 2 (250 managers make 10 decisions over 3 different profiles)
Arms
250 workers will see mandatory task first, 250 will see the optional task first. 125 managers will be in the "quantity" treatment, 125 managers will be in the "quality" treatment.
Primary outcomes
The main supply-side outcome is a binary indicator equal to 1 if the worker accepts the low-promotability task, defined as providing a non-empty answer to at least one optional question, and 0 otherwise. The main demand-side outcome is the managers' choices between different candidates at each round. The primary demand-side outcome is a binary indicator equal to 1 if a manager selects a worker profile in a decision round, and 0 otherwise. Each manager makes 10 choices among 3 profiles, yielding a panel dataset at the manager–profile–round level.
Secondary outcomes
We consider the following secondary supply-side outcomes: - the number of optional questions answered (ranging from 0 to 8) - the total word count across all optional answers - the worker-level helpfulness score

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Keywords