How redundant information can help overcome bias
How to cite
Nicholas, Aaron; Silva, Francisco da; González, Nicolás Figueroa; Jara, Ruben. 2026. "How redundant information can help overcome bias." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0018310. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.18310-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
A common response to the potential manipulation of data by data collectors is the obscuring or transforming of outcome information in order to protect the integrity of the process; e.g. through double blinding, or encryption. This experimental research aims to:
1) check if individuals are able to recognize incentives to manipulate information even when such data have been encrypted by having their labels removed ('outcome blinding').
2) check whether a specific form of encryption (the introduction of redundant labels) successfully reduces manipulation that arose despite outcome blinding.
Intervention
Two treatments to be conducted through Qualtrics, with recruitment from Prolific's panel.
*Baseline treatment*
This is a within-subject design, with three decisions in a fixed sequence.
Participants are given a hypothetical scenario where they are electoral officers attempting to forward the results of an election with two candidates A and B. However, the information they have has been encrypted, and they are uncertain whether the candidate they prefer to win has actually won. The encrypted message is of the form where they see two generic labels, of which one of them is crossed, but the participant does not know which candidate the crossed label belongs to. Participants have to decide whether to forward the information they receive, or to manipulate it by switching the cross to the other label. Participants are paid if the cross is located next to their preferred candidate.
Participants are told the probability that their preferred candidate won.
The three decisions vary as follows:
(1) The probability is set such that they have no incentive to manipulate the information.
(2) The probability is set such that they have incentive to manipulate the information.
(3) The probability is set equal to scenario (2); in addition, the set of labels are expanded to four, with participants told that one of them corresponds to their preferred candidate, and the remaining three correspond to the other candidate; this effective removes the incentive to manipulate the information.
*Do-no-harm treatment*
Identical to the baseline, except the following:
(1) The probability is set such that they have incentive to manipulate the information.
(2) The probability is set such that they have no incentive to manipulate the information.
(3) The probability is set equal to scenario (2); in addition, the set of labels are expanded to four, with participants told that three of them correspond to their preferred candidate, and the remaining one corresponds to the other candidate; while this increases the chance of being paid when manipulating information, the optimal decision remains not manipulating information
Experimental design
Please refer to intervention details above.
Design details
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