Behavioral Incentive Compatibility and Personalized Interventions

How to cite

Rodriguez, Camila Farres. 2026. "Behavioral Incentive Compatibility and Personalized Interventions." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0018307. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.18307-1.0

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Camila Farres Rodriguez*

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0018307
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.18307-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2026-04-20 – 2026-10-20
Countries
Private
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/18307

Abstract

This study examines whether reports in an incentivized measurement task change when participants know that their reports will affect future options. In many real-world settings, information elicited from individuals is used not only to measure an underlying type, but also to determine recommendations, menus, or allocations. If individuals anticipate these downstream consequences, they may adjust their reports accordingly. The experiment studies this possibility in a controlled induced-value environment in which the researcher observes the underlying type. Participants are assigned a token value and complete a multiple price list that determines a reported switch point. In a subsequent allocation stage, the report may affect the set of alternatives available to the participant according to a treatment-specific allocation rule. The design varies these future consequences across treatments to test when elicitation continues to recover the underlying value and when it does not. The main outcomes are deviation from the matching report and the fraction of matching reports, with additional analysis of optimal reporting, learning, and heterogeneity in understanding of incentives. The study also uses post-experimental quiz and survey measures to examine whether reporting behavior is associated with failures to integrate incentives, backward induction, narrow framing, lying aversion, and consideration of future consequences. The experiment is conducted online on Prolific using a between-subjects design.

Intervention

Participants complete an online incentivized experiment consisting of 20 trials. In each trial, a participant is assigned an induced-value token, completes a multiple price list that determines a reported switch point, and then chooses between two alternatives in a subsequent allocation stage. The intervention is the treatment-specific rule that maps the participant’s token value and reported switch point into the two alternatives offered in the allocation stage. Participants are randomly assigned to one of seven between-subjects treatment arms and face the same rule throughout the experiment. Across treatments, the allocation rule varies whether reporting has no future consequence, creates incentives to misreport upward or downward, or introduces uncertainty in how reports affect later options, including cases in which incentive compatibility is preserved. This design allows the study to isolate how anticipated downstream consequences of reporting affect behavior in an otherwise standard incentivized measurement task. Refer to the Analysis Plan, Section 2: Experimental Design, for additional information.

Experimental design

This study is an online, between-subjects experiment conducted on Prolific. Participants are randomly assigned at the individual level to one of seven treatment arms and face the same treatment throughout the study. After consent and a bot check, participants read instructions with comprehension questions and complete a practice trial with open-response practice questions that must be answered correctly before they can continue. The main experiment consists of 20 incentivized trials. In each trial, the participant is assigned an induced-value token, completes a multiple price list that determines a reported switch point, chooses between two alternatives in an allocation stage, and then receives feedback on trial earnings. The intervention is the treatment-specific allocation rule that determines how the token value and reported switch point affect the alternatives offered in the allocation stage. Following the trials, participants complete an incentivized post-experimental quiz and a non-incentivized exit survey. Participants receive a fixed completion payment, additional earnings for correct first-attempt practice answers, and a probabilistic bonus based on either one randomly selected trial or one randomly selected quiz question. Refer to the Analysis Plan, Section 2: Experimental Design, for additional information.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization done by computer at the individual level, with approximately equal assignment across seven treatment arms. Refer to the Analysis Plan, Section 3.4.2: Power and Sample Size, for additional information.
Randomization unit
The unit of randomization is the individual participant. Each participant is randomly assigned to one treatment arm and remains in that treatment for the full experiment.
Clusters
700 individual participants.
Observations
700 individual participants.
Arms
Approximately 100 individual participants per treatment arm, with equal planned assignment across the 7 treatment arms; realized completed sample sizes may be slightly above or below 100 per arm due to attrition. Refer to the Analysis Plan, Section 3.4.2: Power and Sample Size, for additional information.
Primary outcomes
The primary outcomes are two measures of reporting behavior in the incentivized trials: the difference between the participant’s reported switch point and the assigned token value, and an indicator for whether the participant’s reported switch point exactly matches the assigned token value. Both are measured for each participant in each of the 20 incentivized trials. Refer to the Analysis Plan, Sections 3.2: Data, Outcomes and Analysis Overview, for additional information.
Secondary outcomes
Secondary outcomes include the absolute distance between the participant’s report and the treatment-specific payoff-maximizing report, an indicator for whether the participant exactly submits that payoff-maximizing report, participant-level summary measures of reporting behavior, specifically each participant’s average deviation from the assigned token value, average matching rate, average distance from the treatment-specific payoff-maximizing report, average rate of exact optimal reporting across incentivized trials and measures of responses after costly versus non-costly misreports. Additional secondary outcomes include quiz-based participant categories, classifications based on backward induction, narrow framing, and lying aversion, survey responses on consideration of future consequences, practice-question performance and dominance violations. Refer to the Analysis Plan, Sections 2 and 3, for additional information.

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Keywords