Cheap talk and honesty - Experiment 2
How to cite
Fries, Tilman; Parra, Daniel. 2026. "Cheap talk and honesty - Experiment 2." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0018299. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.18299-1.1
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
This is a follow-up to our initial preregistration with identifier AEARCTR-0015630. We propose an experiment on cheap talk. A receiver guesses a secret number, and receives advice from a sender with misaligned incentives. In our initial experiment we had three treatment conditions that varied whether the sender can provide informed advice and how cognitively demanding the receiver finds it to respond to the advice in a sophisticated way. We observed that receivers reacted heterogeneously to informed advice. In this follow-up, we investigate mechanisms behind the observed heterogeneous effects.
Intervention
Basic setup: A receiver guesses a secret number after receiving advice from a sender with misaligned incentives.
Expert-Rep: Replication of original Expert treatment using new receivers while recycling sender messages from the original experiment.
Belief: A treatment where instead of guessing a secret number, the receiver guesses the probability that the sender decided to send the true secret number.
FixBeliefs: A treatment where, before making a guess, the receiver observes the percentage probability that the sender decided to send the true secret number.
NoUncertainty: A treatment that takes uncertainty out of the equation by informing receivers exactly how many senders decided to send the true secret number.
Experimental design
Senders and receivers are told that the computer randomly generated a secret number j by drawing once from {1,2,3,4,5,6,7}. The sender then chooses a number X in {1,2,3,4,5,6,7} to send to the receiver. The receiver observes the message and guesses a value for j. The sender is incentivized to induce a high guess, while the receiver has incentives to be accurate. The treatments vary the context in which the receiver makes the guess.
Design details
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