Ostracism and imperfect observability of individual behavior in common pool resources
How to cite
Murphy, James; Chavez, Carlos; Stranlund, John. 2026. "Ostracism and imperfect observability of individual behavior in common pool resources." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0018284. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.18284-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
Ostracism is common in many social settings and can deter antisocial behavior because social exclusion is an explicit and potentially severe punishment for uncooperative group members. We present laboratory experiments on common-pool resource (CPR) use under the threat of exclusion from CPR groups.
The study makes two contributions motivated by naturally occurring CPR institutions. First, we examine poaching by excluded outsiders. CPR groups often create insiders with access to the resource and outsiders who may be motivated to poach it. Prior research shows that undeterred poaching can undermine cooperative CPR use, but little is known about how poaching interacts with ostracism as an internal sanction. Second, we examine imperfect observability. In many real-world settings, individual actions are only imperfectly observed, yet experimental studies of ostracism typically assume perfect information about others’ choices within a round, and often about past choices and payoffs as well. While experimental work has studied imperfect observability in public goods games with peer punishment, we are not aware of comparable work in settings where ostracism is the punishment mechanism.
Our main research question is how imperfect observability of withdrawals by CPR group members affects the use and effectiveness of ostracism in promoting resource conservation, both with and without the possibility of poaching by excluded individuals.
Intervention
T0: No ostracism (Baseline). Our experiment treatments start with a simple CPR game as the baseline. This is a standard repeated linear common pool resource game, without the possibility of ostracism.
T1: Ostracism + Perfect observability. This treatment has the same structure as the Baseline treatment, but CPR members may vote to exclude individuals from the group. After all withdrawal decisions are submitted in each round, insiders can vote to remove one individual from the insider group under perfect information about current withdrawals. Excluded individuals only consume their own endowment in each round.
T2: Ostracism + Imperfect observability (High quality). This treatment is the same as T1 except that CPR group members receive a stochastic (high quality) signal of the other CPR group members’ current withdrawals. There is a 75% chance that the signal of an individual’s withdrawal is true; the remaining 25% is distributed uniformly over the other possible withdrawal levels.
T3: Ostracism + Imperfect observability (Low quality). This treatment is the same as T1 except that CPR group members receive a stochastic (low quality) signal of the other CPR group members’ current withdrawals. There is a 50% chance that the signal of an individual’s withdrawal is true; the remaining 50% is distributed uniformly over the other possible withdrawal levels.
T4: Ostracism + Perfect observability + Poaching. This treatment is same as T1, except that excluded individuals may withdraw from the CPR without any consequence for doing so.
T5: Ostracism + Imperfect observability (High quality) + Poaching. This treatment is the same as T4, but with the imperfect observability (high quality) feature of T2.
T6: Ostracism + Imperfect observability (Low quality) + Poaching. This treatment is the same as T4, but with the imperfect observability (low quality) feature of T3.
Experimental design
This is a laboratory experiment, conducted in a standard university experimental economics lab at the U of Talca, Chile. Students will be recruited from Universidad de Talca and, if needed, from other neighboring universities. Subjects will be randomly assigned to treatments. The experiment consists of a CPR game in which CPR members are paid from a shared account, but individuals may withdraw units from this account for their private benefit. The game is parameterized so that it is individually rational for individuals to withdraw as many units from the shared account as possible, but leaving the shared account intact maximizes group welfare. Except for the baseline CPR experiment, CPR members may vote (by majority rule) to exclude others.
In addition to a baseline treatment, our experiment follows a 3X2 design. The design varies observability by all subjects of current-period individual withdrawals from perfect observability of withdrawals, to subjects receiving high quality signals (described below) of individual withdrawals, to subjects receiving low quality signals of individual withdrawals. The design also varies whether excluded individuals may or may not poach from the resource.
Design details
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