Financial Incentives and Dishonesty: An Experiment with Public Health Workers
How to cite
Khan, Muhammad Yasir. 2026. "Financial Incentives and Dishonesty: An Experiment with Public Health Workers." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0018274. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.18274-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
This project investigates dishonest behavior of public workers, lady community health workers (LHWs), in which workers lie about having completed their tasks. LHWs are required to make a fixed number of of households within a stipulated time period to deliver public health services and collect data about the health of the community. In this project, we first study if the data collected and reported by workers is truthful and reliable. Second, we elicit time preferences of workers through convex-time-budget method to identify present biased workers. Third, through a randomized control trial, we investigate if truthfulness of the reports submitted by the workers can be increased through providing performance-based incentives that vary with time. Specifically, we randomize workers into three groups: (i) Uniform bonus group receives a piece rate incentive that is constant for any report they submit throughout the study period, (ii) Upfront bonus group receives a piece rate that is 1.5 times the uniform rate for any reported work claimed during the first half of the study period, and 0.5 times the uniform rate for work claimed during the second half, and (iii) a control group that does not receive any performance linked piece rate. We use independent auditors to verify the reports through visiting the households the workers claimed to have visited.
Intervention
The intervention tests if incentives linked to performance can reduce misreporting by workers, and if varying the size of the incentives linked to the timing of the work done matters for this.
Experimental design
In baseline, workers participate in a time preference elicitation experiment using convex time budget in a real effort task. Based on their estimated time preferences (β), workers are classified as present-biased (β<1) and non-present biased (β ≥1).
All health workers conduct their routine household visits and report them for a 6day working week with the date of each visit.
In each treatment condition, LHWs received details about their assigned treatment via a phone call from enumerators two days prior to the start of their reporting week.
Front-load: In this treatment, workers receive a baseline payment of Rs. 200 for participation, and a per-unit payment linked to the number of reported visits with maximum visits to be used for payment capped at 36. The per-unit bonus for visits completed during the first 3 days of the work week was Rs.12.5 per visit and Rs. 4.2 per visit for visits completed during the last 3 days.
Uniform bonus: In this treatment, workers receive baseline payment of Rs. 200 and the constant per-unit payment for their work throughout the workweek. This financial payment will be linked to the number of reported visits, with a uniform per-visit bonus of PKR 8.3 per visit.
Control: In this treatment, workers receive a flat bonus of PKR 500. The workers will be asked to record visits as in other treatment groups.
Design details
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