Delegation and Endowment Heterogeneity in a Threshold Public Goods Game

How to cite

Xie, Huan; Zhang, Xiao. 2026. "Delegation and Endowment Heterogeneity in a Threshold Public Goods Game." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0018246. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.18246-1.0

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Huan Xie* , Xiao Zhang

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0018246
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.18246-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
On going
Trial dates
2025-10-22 – 2026-05-30
Countries
Private
JEL codes
C91, C92, H41
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/18246

Abstract

We conduct a lab experiment based on a static threshold public goods game with endowment heterogeneity and team delegation. Using a two-by-two between-subjects design, we examine the effects of heterogeneous versus homogeneous team endowments, as well as the impact of delegate selection through elections versus random assignment. We aim to analyze how these two dimensions influence the success rate and efficiency of public goods provision, as well as equilibrium selection. Our experiment sheds light on the roles of wealth inequality and political institutions in global climate cooperation.

Experimental design

In the experiment, we implement the one-shot threshold public goods game with four teams, each with three team members, repeatedly in multiple periods. We employ a two-by-two between-subject design. The first treatment variable varies the team endowments. In Homogeneous Endowment treatment, each team has an equal endowment. While in Heterogeneous Endowment treatment, there are two rich teams and two poor teams. Across the Homogeneous and Heterogeneous Endowment treatments, we keep the global endowment constant for a fair comparison.
For the second treatment arm, we vary whether the delegates in each group are chosen randomly by the computer program or elected through a democratic procedure. In Delegation Voting treatment, one delegate is elected within each team to make the team’s contribution decision. The election procedure involves a Pledge stage, in which participants indicate their intended amount of contribution to the public good if elected as the team delegate, and a Voting stage which uses the majority voting mechanism. On contrast, in Random Delegation treatment, team members are informed about the random delegate’s ID directly.

Design details

Randomization method
randomization done in office by a computer
Randomization unit
Treatments are randomized at the session level. Each participant's player type is randomly assigned in each round. Group members are rematched and randomly drawn each round.
Clusters
16-20 sessions
Observations
200-250 subjects
Arms
4-5 sessions each treatment, 12 subjects per session
Primary outcomes
public goods provision, efficiency, equilibrium selection

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords